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ENGLISH-ONLY RULES AND THE
RIGHT TO SPEAK ONE'S PRIMARY
LANGUAGE IN THE WORKPLACEt
Juan F. Perea*
They come from every country in Central and South
America, the Caribbean and Spain. They differ in many
ways. When they come to the United States, language is
perhaps their only true bond.1
On May 25, 1920, Robert Meyer, an instructor at the Zion
Evangelical Lutheran Congregation's parochial school, taught
the reading of biblical stories in the German language to a ten-
year-old student at the school. Meyer was subsequently indicted
and convicted of violating a Nebraska statute that prohibited
the teaching of any language other than English to students who
had not passed the eighth grade. Meyer's conviction was upheld
by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.2
In Meyer v. Nebraska,3 the United States Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the statute interfered with the profession of
modern language teachers, with the acquisition of knowledge by
students, and with the prerogative of parents to control the edu-
cation of their children.' The Court concluded that the statute
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
noting that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which
must be respected. The protection of the Constitution extends
0 1990 Juan F. Perea, all rights reserved.
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1. Ribadeneira, From Different Worlds, They Share a Label, Boston Globe, June 5,
1988, at 40, col. 2.
2. Meyer v. State, 107 Neb. 657, 658-59, 187 N.W. 100, 101 (1922).
3. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
4. Id. at 401.
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to all, to those who speak other languages as well as to those
born with English on the tongue."5
Despite the Court's recognition of a "fundamental right" to
language, secured from governmental interference, an em-
ployee's right to speak his primary language in the workplace is
not yet recognized under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.6 The law on the right to speak one's primary language7 has
developed in cases considering English-only rules, which require
the use of English, at least at certain times, while an employee is
on the employer's premises. Until very recently, the courts did
not recognize the right of Hispanic employees to speak Spanish
to each other while on the job.' In the leading case on this issue,
Garcia v. Gloor," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decided that a rule restricting an employee's use of
Spanish while on the job did not violate, or even implicate, Title
VII. More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit decided a very similar case, Gutierrez v. Munici-
pal Court,10 concluding that a similar rule did constitute na-
tional origin discrimination in violation of Title VII. The Su-
preme Court, however, vacated the Gutierrez decision as moot."
Although the Supreme Court did not reach the merits in Gu-
tierrez or consider the legality of English-only rules in the work-
place under Title VII, eventually the Court will have to resolve
this issue. It is certain to recur. The numbers alone guarantee it.
5. Id. Meyer has continuing vitality in modern constitutional law. The case stands for
the proposition that governmental invasions of personal identity and freedom are likely
to be invalid when directed at members of discrete and insular minorities for whom the
functioning of normal political processes have been curtailed. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1319-20 (2d ed. 1988). Language minorities are a discrete and insular
minority. See S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-32 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 774, 791-98 (discussing the history of discrimination against
language minorities that has impeded their participation in the political process; this
history of discrimination motivated the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to
include language minorities). See infra notes 114-15, 122-26 and accompanying text.
6. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982) (prohibiting employers from discrimi-
nating in employment relationships on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin).
7. Primary language, as used in this Article, refers to a person's native language, usu-
ally the language spoken by one's parents in the home and one's first language.
8. Apparently all of the cases on this issue decided by the courts and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission have involved restrictions upon Spanish-speaking
employees. See infra notes 212, 215-17. Because of this situation and the large number of
Hispanic persons in the United States, this Article will focus principally on the right of
Hispanics to speak Spanish in the workplace. The principles stated here apply with
equal force to restrictions upon the exercise of any primary language other than English.
9. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
10. 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
11. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
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The United States currently contains the fourth or fifth largest
Spanish-speaking population in the world. 2 Estimates of the
Hispanic population in the United States range between 18 mil-
lion and 30 million. 3 By the year 2000, Hispanics will be the
largest ethnic minority group in the country. 4 Moreover, this
growth is reflected in the workplace. According to one recent
study, between 1980 and 1987, the number of Hispanic workers
rose dramatically, accounting for almost a fifth of employment
growth in the United States.' This. dramatic increase is ex-
pected to continue; projections indicate that, by the year 2000,
ten percent of the nation's labor force will be Hispanic.'"
Many Hispanics currently in the work force, as well as many
of the new Hispanic entrants, speak Spanish as their primary
language and English as a second language. 7 Generally, one can
expect them to speak Spanish to their fellow employees who are
Hispanic. Employers and supervisors, not understanding Span-
ish, may want to restrict its use in the workplace. The question
of the legality of English-only rules, therefore, is very likely to
recur until the Supreme Court decides the issue.
Employers use English-only rules to restrict the use of lan-
guages other than English in the workplace and during working
hours. The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) recognizes two types of English-only rules: (1) a
rule requiring employees to speak only English in the workplace
at all times, and (2) a limited English-only rule, requiring that
employees speak only in English at certain times.'" This Article
will focus on limited English-only rules, and particularly on
those rules that seek to restrict private conversations between
employees in languages other than English. 9
12. T. WEYR, HISPANIC U.S.A. 3 (1988).
13. Id. at 1.
14. Ribadeneira, Boom Bypassing Mass. Hispanics, Boston Globe, June 5, 1988, at
40, col. 4.
15. Cattan, The Growing Presence of Hispanics in the U.S. Work Force, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., August 1988, at 9.
16. Id. at 10.
17. The estimated number of persons claiming Spanish as their mother tongue was
11,400,525 in 1979, an increase of 46% over the figure reported in 1970-7,823,583. See J.
FISHMAN, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ETHNIC REVIVAL: PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE AND
ETHNICITY 147 (Table 14). The number of persons speaking Spanish is likely to be higher
today.
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a),(b) (1989). The EEOC presumes that an English-only rule
in effect at all times violates Title VII, while a limited English-only rule, properly
promulgated, must be justified by business necessity. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a)-(c) (1989).
19. The principal cases on English-only rules have involved rules seeking to restrict
private conversations between employees. See Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031,
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This Article analyzes the issues raised by English-only rules
and the decisions discussing these rules. Part I reviews the lead-
ing cases on English-only rules. The Article then explores sev-
eral issues that must be considered in deciding any English-only
rule case under Title VII. Part II addresses whether speaking
one's primary language should constitute a protected right as an
aspect of national origin under Title VII. This Article argues
that primary language should be protected under Title VII for
several reasons: the courts and the EEOC construe the term
"national origin" broadly; primary language constitutes a funda-
mental aspect of ethnicity and national origin; and the difficulty
of second-language acquisition renders primary language practi-
cally immutable for many persons whose primary language is not
English. Part III argues that English-only rules have an exclu-
sive adverse impact on language minority groups distinct from
the nonexclusive effect of facially neutral rules typically consid-
ered under disparate impact cases. Part IV analyzes the current
burden of proof standards for establishing discrimination under
Title VII in light of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 0 This
Part proposes that courts should hold employers to a stricter
standard than the Wards Cove standard for proving business
justification in recognition of the exclusive impact of English-
only rules. Finally, Part V discusses the extent of the business
justification that can properly justify an employer's use of a lan-
guage restriction under the standard established in Wards Cove.
I. THE LEADING CASES ON ENGLISH-ONLY RULES
The leading cases on the legality of English-only rules are
Garcia v. Gloor2I and Gutierrez v. Municipal Court.22 These
1036, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989). More restrictive rules can be analyzed
using disparate treatment theory, disparate impact theory and the business justification
standard recently established in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115,
2125-26 (1989). See infra Parts III and IV.
20. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
21. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
22. 838 F.2d 1031, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989). In another case, Saucedo
v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979), the court found that an
employee's discharge for speaking Spanish violated Title VII. The case has little prece-
dential value in this context, however, because the court did not analyze the prohibition
on speaking Spanish, but instead focused on the unfair treatment of the plaintiff. Id. at
921-23. Unlike the rules in Garcia and Gutierrez, the employer's rule in Saucedo was
informal. Id. at 921-22. Furthermore, the court did not state clearly whether the em-
ployer's conduct constituted national origin discrimination or race discrimination. In-
stead, the court found that Saucedo was discharged "because of racial animus." Id. at
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cases disagree on whether an English-only rule constitutes na-
tional origin discrimination under Title VII.23 Garcia, the only
remaining precedent on the issue, establishes the legality of
English-only rules. In Garcia, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit decided that an employee fired for speaking Spanish on
the job had not stated a claim of national origin discrimination
under Title VII.24 The plaintiff, Hector Garcia, was a Mexican
American working as a salesman for Gloor Lumber and Supply,
Inc. Seven of the eight salesmen, and thirty-one of the thirty-
nine persons employed by Gloor Lumber were Hispanic. The
court observed that the high percentage of Hispanic salesmen
may have been "a matter perhaps of business necessity, because
75% of the population in its business area is of Hispanic back-
ground and many of Gloor's customers wish to be waited on by a
salesman who speaks Spanish." '25
Gloor Lumber had an English-only rule prohibiting its sales-
men, including Garcia, from speaking Spanish unless they were
speaking with Spanish-speaking customers. Although they could
speak as they wanted during breaks, the Hispanic salesmen
could not speak to each other in Spanish while working in the
store.2"
On June 10, 1975, a fellow Mexican-American employee asked
Garcia about an item requested by a customer. Garcia responded
in Spanish that the item was not available. Alton Gloor, an of-
ficer of Gloor Lumber, heard Garcia speaking in Spanish and
subsequently discharged him. Garcia sued, claiming that his dis-
charge constituted national origin discrimination in violation of
Title VII.
27
920. The court held that the employer had breached its "obligation to avoid treating its
employees discriminatorily." Id. at 922. In dicta, however, the court stated that "a duly
and officially promulgated . . . rule absolutely prohibiting the speaking of a foreign lan-
guage during the drilling of a well or the reworking of a well, and providing for immedi-
ate discharge for violation of the rule, would be a reasonable rule for which a business
necessity could be demonstrated." Id. at 921.
23. Compare Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266, 268 with Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039-40 (dis-
agreeing on application of Title VII to English-only rules).
24. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270-71. For law review commentaries discussing Garcia see
the following articles: Note, Language Discrimination under Title VII: The Silent Right
of National Origin Discrimination, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 667 (1982) (authored by John
W. Aniol) (approving result in Garcia); Note, Garcia v. Gloor: Mutable Characteristics
Rationale Extended to National Origin Discrimination, 32 MERCER L. REV. 1275 (1981)
(authored by Dwight J. Davis) (also approving the result).
25. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266-67.
26. Id. at 266.
27. Id.
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Affirming the district court, the court of appeals held that
there was no national origin discrimination.2 8 The basis for the
court's decision was its view that, for a bilingual person, the
choice of which language to speak at a particular time is purely a
matter of individual preference that has no compelling nexus to
national origin.29 The court wrote that "[n]either the statute nor
common understanding equates national origin with the lan-
guage that one chooses to speak."30 Interpreting national origin
as one's birthplace or the birthplace of one's ancestors, the court
stated that Title VII "does not support an interpretation that
equates the language an employee prefers to use with his na-
tional origin.
'3 1
The court also reasoned that a bilingual employee's desire to
speak his native language is not an immutable characteristic like
place of birth, race, or sex.3 2 Rejecting the argument that Gloor
Lumber's rule had a disparate impact on Hispanics, the court
stated that "there is no disparate impact if the rule is one that
the affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is
a matter of individual preference.
'33
Finding no disparate impact and no violation of Title VII, the
court declined to examine the employer's justifications for the
English-only rule.3 ' The court apparently accepted the district
court's finding that Gloor's business reasons for the rule were
valid. 5 Gloor Lumber offered several reasons for the rule: its
English-speaking customers objected to conversations between
employees in Spanish, conversations the customers could not
understand; requiring bilingual employees to speak English at
all times, other than when they served Hispanic customers,
would improve their literacy and fluency in English; and the rule
would enable Gloor Lumber's English-speaking supervisors to
supervise Hispanic employees more effectively.3
While the Garcia court found no national origin discrimina-
tion and therefore no violation of Title VII, the Gutierrez court
evaluated a similar rule, enacted under similar circumstances,
28. Id.
29. Id. at 270.
30. Id. at 268 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 270.
32. Id. at 269.
33. Id. at 270.
34. Id. at 271.




and came to the opposite conclusion.3 7 The plaintiff, Alva Gu-
tierrez, worked as a deputy court clerk in the Southeast Judicial
District of the Los Angeles Municipal Court. She, like a number
of other deputy clerks, was Hispanic American and spoke both
Spanish and English. In addition to their other responsibilities,
these deputy clerks translated for non-English-speaking persons
who used the court.38
In March 1984, the municipal court issued a rule prohibiting
employees from speaking any language other than English ex-
cept when they were translating for persons not fluent in En-
glish. 39 Later that year, the municipal court amended the rule to
permit employees to speak in their preferred language during
breaks and during lunch. During work time, however, unless
they were translating, the Hispanic clerks were prohibited from
speaking Spanish.40
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of a preliminary injunction barring enforce-
ment of the municipal court's rule."1 The court based its analysis
on the theory that the rule had a disparate impact on Hispan-
ics. 2 Accordingly, the court first evaluated whether the rule had
a disparate impact on Spanish-speaking employees and then
whether the municipal court's rule was justified by business
necessity.
43
The Gutierrez court found that language is an important as-
pect of national origin.4 The court wrote that "[t]he cultural
identity of certain minority groups is tied to the use of their pri-
mary tongue. ' '45 Despite an individual's assimilation into Ameri-
can society, "his primary language remains an important link to
his ethnic culture and identity."'4" Furthermore, according to the
court, "[tlhe mere fact that an employee is bilingual does not
37. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736
(1989).
38. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036.
39. Initially, the municipal court's rule prohibited more Spanish than the Gloor Lum-
ber rule, which permitted employees to speak in the language they preferred during
lunch and break times and outside the store. Compare Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036 with
Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266 (showing initial municipal court rule as more restrictive than
Gloor Lumber's rule).
40. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036.
41. Id. at 1045-46 & n.20.
42. Id. at 1038-41.
43. Id. at 1038-44.
44. Id. at 1038-39.
45. Id. at 1039.
46. Id.
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eliminate the relationship between his primary language and the
culture that is derived from his national origin.
'4 7
Relying on regulations published by the EEOC, the court con-
cluded that English-only rules have a disparate impact:
We agree that English-only rules generally have an ad-
verse impact on protected groups and that they should
be closely scrutinized. We also agree that such rules can
"create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intim-
idation." Finally, we agree that such rules can readily
mask an intent to discriminate on the basis of national
origin.48
Adopting the EEOC's approach to these rules,49 as well as the
traditional structure of disparate impact analysis, the court con-
cluded that a limited English-only rule must be justified by a
business necessity before it can be enforced. 0 The court con-
cluded that none of the justifications offered by the appellants
for their English-only rule met the business necessity standard."
The Gutierrez decision, before it was vacated as moot by the
Supreme Court, created a split in the circuits.52 The court in
Garcia found no link between a person's primary language and
national origin, no disparate impact upon Hispanics, and, conse-
quently, no violation of Title VII resulting from the enforcement
of an English-only rule. While not acknowledging that it was do-
ing so, the Gutierrez court differed on each of these issues.
Under Gutierrez, a person's primary language is vitally linked to
his national origin, an English-only rule has a disparate impact
upon protected groups whose primary language is not English,
and, under circumstances similar to those in Garcia, an English-
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1040 (citation omitted).
49. The EEOC regulations provide that "[a]n employer may have a rule requiring
that employees speak only in English at certain times where the employer can show that
the rule is justified by business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(b) (1989).
50. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1040. Gutierrez, of course, was decided before Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), which significantly lightened the burden of
justification faced by employers, who need not prove the business necessity for a chal-
lenged practice any longer. See infra Part IV.B.
51. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1044-45. The municipal court offered several justifications
for its rule: preventing the workplace from turning into a "Tower of Babel"; promoting
racial harmony; and enhancing the effectiveness of supervision. Additionally, the court
stressed that the United States and California are both English-speaking and that the
rule was required by the California Constitution. Id. at 1042-43.
52. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying rehearing




only rule probably violates Title VII. In reaching its conclusions,
the Gutierrez court examined the employer's justifications to de-
termine whether a business justification existed for the rule.
Although no split exists among the circuits at the moment be-
cause the Supreme Court decided to vacate Gutierrez, the ques-
tion of the enforceability of English-only rules is likely to re-
cur. 3 The Supreme Court and the lower courts will need to
decide three issues when hearing one of these cases. The first is
whether the exercise of one's primary language should constitute
a protected right as an aspect of national origin under Title VII.
Second, the courts must consider whether English-only rules
have a disparate impact upon protected language minority
groups and, if so, the appropriate standard for justification of
these rules. Third, the courts must consider the proper contours
of the business justifications that will support the use of
English-only rules in the workplace."' This Article will discuss
each of these issues in turn.
II. THE TITLE VII ANALYSIS
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on national origin. 5
The statute makes no reference, however, to discrimination on
the basis of language. The fundamental question, therefore, is
whether a person's primary language warrants protection under
Title VII as an aspect of national origin.
The Supreme Court has characterized the legislative history of
the statutory phrase "national origin" as "quite meager."' 6 The
brief congressional debate on the term "national origin" suggests
that the legislators contemplated persons who came from, or
whose forefathers came from, a particular country.5 7 There was
53. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
54. The business justification issue will be analyzed using the framework and burdens
of proof enunciated in the recently decided case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989), which has changed significantly the employer's burden of justifi-
cation. See infra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
Id. (emphasis added).
56. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973).
57. During the debate on the amendment adding the phrase 'national origin' to the
House bill, Representative Roosevelt explained that "'national origin' means national. It
WINTER 19901
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no commentary, however, on the meaning of national origin
discrimination. 58
Primary language should be protected as an aspect of "na-
tional origin" for several reasons. First, the courts and the
EEOC have interpreted the phrase "national origin" broadly
and have extended the protection of Title VII to bar discrimina-
tion against persons with characteristics closely correlated with
national origin.5 9 Second, the sociology of linguistics establishes
the importance of primary language as a fundamental aspect of
ethnicity and national origin.6 0 Third, although primary lan-
guage is not immutable in the same sense as protected charac-
teristics like race or sex, primary language is what this writer
will term "practically immutable," and thus entitled to statutory
protection. 1
A. Broad Construction of National Origin
The courts have construed "national origin" broadly to in-
clude characteristics that are correlated with national origin.
Several courts, for example, have concluded that an employee's
foreign accent, provided that it does not interfere with the em-
ployee's ability to perform his job duties, is not a legitimate jus-
tification for discrimination under Title VII62 Courts also have
invalidated minimum height requirements that have discrimina-
tory impact on Mexican Americans or Asian Americans and that
means the country from which you or your forebears came from. You may come from
Poland, Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country." 110 CONG. REC. 2549
(1964), reprinted in UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND IX OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3179-80 (1968). See
also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 305 (2d ed. 1983).
58. See Note, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII,
94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1169 & n.25 (1985) (authored by Stephen M. Cutler).
59. See infra Part II.A.
60. See infra Part II.B.
61. See infra Part II.C.
62. See, e.g., Carino v. Univ. of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th
Cir. 1984) (holding that a foreign accent that does not interfere with a person's ability to
perform job duties is not a legitimate justification under Title VII for an adverse employ-
ment action); Bell v. Home Life Ins. Co., 596 F. Supp. 1549, 1555 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (stat-
ing that discrimination because of foreign accent can constitute national origin discrimi-
nation); Berke v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 387, 391-
92, 394 (S.D. Ohio 1978), aff'd per curiam, 628 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1980); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1606.6(b)(1) (1989) (EEOC regulations stating that discrimination because of
foreign accent may be national origin discrimination).
[VOL. 23:2
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are not justified by business necessity.6 3 The Gutierrez court
treated primary language as a characteristic essentially linked
with national origin"4 and entitled to protection under Title
VII.65
The federal agency charged with enforcing Title VII, the
EEOC, also construes national origin discrimination broadly to
include discrimination because an individual has the physical,
cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.6
In its Guidelines on National Origin Discrimination, 67 the EEOC
wrote that "[t]he primary language of an individual is often an
essential national origin characteristic."68 Specifically, several
EEOC decisions hold that rules prohibiting Hispanics from
speaking Spanish on the job constitute a form of national origin
discrimination. 9 The views of the administrative agency that
enforces Title VII are entitled to special deference by the
courts.70
Accordingly, under the broad construction of "national origin"
applied by the courts, and under the explicit guidelines and de-
cisions of the EEOC, primary language should be protected
under Title VII.
63. See, e.g., Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding minimum height requirement for firemen had a disparate impact on Mexican
Americans and was not proven to be job related); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 395 F. Supp. 378, 380-81 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (holding minimum height restriction
for police officers had a disparate impact on Hispanics, Asians, and women).
64. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1039, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736
(1989); accord Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1520 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
("[A]n individual's primary language skill generally flows from his or her national ori-
gin."), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987). But see Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268,
270-71 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
65. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1038.
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1989).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1-.8 (1989).
68. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1989). The regulation also states that "[a] rule requiring
employees to speak only English at all times in the workplace is a burdensome term and
condition of employment." Id.
69. See EEOC Dec. No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820, 1823 (1981);
EEOC Dec. No. 72-0281, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6293 (1971); EEOC Dec. No. 71446, 2 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1128 (1970).
70. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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B. Primary Language is a Fundamental Aspect of Ethnicity
Primary language, like accent, is closely correlated and inex-
tricably linked with national origin.71 Prevailing social attitudes,
however, deny any relationship between language and culture or
ethnicity, leading to the belief that the restriction of language
rights does not interfere with ethnic identity or cultural free-
dom.72 The court in Garcia adopted this position, reasoning that
"[n]either [Title VII] nor common understanding equates na-
tional origin with the language that one chooses to speak.
'7 3
Such attitudes are rejected by scholars of ethnicity and lan-
guage. One leading scholar, Joshua Fishman, defines ethnicity as
"both the sense and the expression of 'collective, intergenera-
tional cultural continuity,' i.e. the sensing and expressing of
links to 'one's own kind (one's own people),'" with whom one
shares ancestral origins.7 It is through the expression of ethnic-
ity, one's cultural continuity and cultural traits, that "national
origin" has perceptible meaning.75 Primary language is recog-
nized in sociology and sociolinguistics as a fundamental aspect
of ethnicity. 76 Fishman has written that "language and ethnic
71. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736
(1989).
72. N. CONKLIN & M. LOUUE, A HOST OF TONGUES: LANGUAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1983). Conklin and Lourie state:
[PIrevailing mainstream attitudes deny any relationship between language and
culture, arguing that revocation of language rights in no way compromises the
integrity of cultural freedoms upon which our nation was constituted. Paradoxi-
cally, while language is generally viewed as nothing but a means of communica-
tion, standard English is held up as the only appropriate embodiment of the
national character.
Id. at 279.
73. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
74. J. FISHMAN, supra note 17, at 4.
75. See Note, supra note 58, at 1166-67 & nn.11, 13 (commenting on cultural traits
related to national origin).
76. J. FISHMAN, supra note 17. Fishman explains:
Ethnicity is . . . belonging or pertaining to a phenomenologically complete, sep-
arate, historically deep cultural collectivity, a collectivity polarized on perceived
authenticity. This "belonging" is experienced and interpreted physically (biolog-
ically), behaviorally (culturally) and phenomenologically (intuitively) ...
[Ciharacterized as it is on all three [of these dimensions] it is a very mystic,
moving and powerful link with the past and an energizer with respect to the
present and future. It is fraught with moral imperatives, with obligations to
"one's own kind," and with wisdoms, rewards and proprieties that are both tan-
gible and intangible. . . . As such, it is language-related to a very high and natu-
ral degree, both overtly (imbedded as it is in verbal culture and implying as it
does structurally dependent intuitions) and covertly (the supreme symbol sys-
tem [primary language] quintessentially symbolizes its users and distinguishes
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authenticity may come to be viewed as highly interdependent."77
Some scholars view Hispanic culture as imbedded in the lan-
guage of Spanish speakers, in the sense that both their culture
and their language are derived from the reality in which they
live; in turn, the culture and the language create and shape that
reality. 8 Language and culture together, therefore, form the ba-
sic orientation toward reality of any given person or social
group.79 Expert testimony in Garcia also stated that "the Span-
ish language is the most important aspect of ethnic identifica-
tion for Mexican Americans." a
A number of legal commentators also recognize that language
is inextricably linked to national origin.8 1 One commentator
between them and others). Indeed this is so to such a degree that language and
ethnic authenticity may come to be viewed as highly interdependent.
Id. at 70-71; see also N. CONKLIN & M. LoURIE, supra note 72, at 279 ("[F]or many Amer-
icans, speech is an indicator of cultural identity, second in importance only to physical
appearance. Further, accent, language choice, verbal style, choice of words, phrases, and
gestures act as a primary vehicle for creative expression by individuals and by groups.");
Fishman, The Sociology of Language: An Interdisciplinary Social Science Approach to
Language and Society, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 217 (J. Fishman
ed. 1971)
[Language] is not merely a carrier of content, whether latent, or manifest. Lan-
guage itself is content, a referent for loyalties and animosities, an indicator of
social statuses and personal relationships, a marker of situations and topics as
well as of the societal goals and the large-scale value-laden arenas of interaction
that typify every speech community.
Id. at 219.
77. J. FISHMAN, supra note 17, at 70.
78. Christian & Christian, Spanish Language and Culture in the Southwest, in LAN-
GUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 280, 300 (J. Fishman ed. 1966) [hereinafter LAN-
GUAGE LOYALTY].
79. Id.
80. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
81. See, e.g., Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C.L. REV. 303, 351-57 (1986); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Freedom from Discrimina-
tion in Choice of Language and International Human Rights, 1 S. ILL. U.L.J. 151, 152
(1976) ("[Llanguage is commonly taken as a prime indicator of an individual's group
identifications.") (footnote omitted); Piatt, Toward Domestic Recognition of a Human
Right to Language, 23 Hous. L. REV. 885, 898-901 (1986); Note, "Official English": Fed-
eral Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1345, 1355 (1987) ("As a separate basis for finding that language-based classifications
implicate suspect criteria, courts might determine that such classifications in fact dis-
criminate on the basis of national origin. Litigants have argued that no factor is more
intimately tied to a person's ethnic or national identity than is language.") (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter Note, Official English]; Note, supra note 58, at 1165 & n.5 (1985)
("Differences in dress, language, accent, and custom associated with a non-American ori-
gin are more likely to elicit prejudicial attitudes than the fact of the origin itself."); Com-
ment, Native-Born Acadians and the Equality Ideal, 46 LA. L. REV. 1151, 1167 (1986)
(authored by James Harvey Domengeaux) ("Language is the lifeblood of every ethnic
group. To economically and psychologically penalize a person for practicing his native
tongue is to strike at the core of ethnicity.").
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wrote that language is one of the key characteristics "that define
social groups . . . . A distinctive language sets a cultural group
off from others, with one consistent unhappy consequence
throughout American history: discrimination against members of
the cultural minority. Language differences provide both a way
to rationalize subordination and a ready means for accomplish-
ing it.""S
The existence in the United States of a thriving ethnic
mother-tongue press, non-English commercial broadcasting, and
schools designed to preserve foreign languages, demonstrates
that primary language is fundamental to ethnicity. The non-
English press, particularly the Hispanic press, increased sub-
stantially in the United States between 1960 and 1980.3 The
number of Spanish-language publications grew from 49 to 165.2
The ethnic mother-tongue press provides a vital forum for eth-
nic concerns and a vehicle for ethnic pride.8 5 Non-English radio
and television broadcasting also increased between 1960 and
1980, though not at the same rate as commercial broadcasting as
a whole.8 6 Mother-tongue schools also illustrate the connection
between language and ethnicity. The roughly 6600 mother-
tongue schools currently operating in the United States 7 are
"unequivocally committed to the view that their particular lan-
guage and ethnicity linkage is vital and, hopefully, eternal.
' '88
None of the important sociological and psychological factors
that make primary language an important, indeed crucial, aspect
82. Karst, supra note 81, at 351-52 (footnotes omitted).
83. J. FISHMAN, supra note 17, at 344-45. This increase follows a substantial decrease
in the non-English press from the 1930s, when ethnic mother-tongue publications
reached a peak, to the 1960s. See Fishman, Hayden, and Warshauer, The Non-English
and the Ethnic Group Press, in LANGUAGE LOYALTY, supra note 78, at 51-52.
84. J. FISHMAN, supra note 17, at 344-45.
85. Id. at 330. See also Glazer, The Process and Problems of Language-Mainte-
nance: An Integrative Review, in A PLURALISTIc NATION: THE LANGUAGE ISSUE IN THE
UNITED STATES 32 (1978). Glazer states:
In America, the immigrant wants to preserve, as far as possible, his heritage
from the old country. These (sic) are represented preeminently by his language
and his religion. At the same time, he wants to participate in the common life
and find a place in the American community. In these two motives, we have at
once the problem of the foreign-language press and its solution.
Id. at 33. (quoting R. PARK, THE IMMIGRANT PRESS AND ITS CONTROL (1922)).
86. J. FISHMAN, supra note 17, at 224-26. In 1982, there were approximately 275 tele-
vision stations broadcasting during at least a protion of the day in non-English lan-
guages. Approximately 60% of these stations broadcast in Spanish. Id.
87. Id. at 244 (Table 15), 364.
88. Id. at 365. The majority of ethnic mother-tongue schools teach in the languages
of Hebrew, Yiddish, Spanish, Pennsylvania German, and Greek. Id. at 242.
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of ethnicity are different in the case of a bilingual person. 9 Even
for a bilingual, links to one's "own people" and ethnicity depend
heavily on primary language. A study of Spanish-speaking bi-
linguals demonstrated that they associate Spanish with family
and friendship and values of intimacy.9 Accordingly, given all of
these factors, the Garcia court erred in concluding that Gloor
Lumber's English-only rule "did not forbid cultural expression
to persons for whom compliance with it might impose
hardship."91
C. Primary Language is Practically Immutable
Primary language, therefore, merits protection under Title VII
as a fundamental aspect and a crucial expression of national ori-
gin and ethnicity. The exercise of a person's primary language
also warrants protection under Title VII for another reason. One
of the rationales for protecting a personal characteristic under
Title VII is its immutability.9 2 With the exceptions of religion
and pregnancy, all of the characteristics protected under the
statute-race, color, national origin, and sex-are immutable.
The Garcia court viewed a bilingual's choice of language, how-
ever, as purely a matter of individual preference and not
immutable."
89. In contrast, the Garcia court reasoned that, for a multilingual person, the matter
of which language to speak at a particular time is purely a matter of individual choice
and without invidious effects. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
90. Greenfield, Situational Measures of Normative Language Views in Relation to
Person, Place and Topic Among Puerto Rican Bilinguals, in 2 ADVANCES IN THE SOCIOL-
OGY OF LANGUAGE 17, 33 (J. Fishman ed. 1972) ("Use of Spanish was claimed primarily in
the domain of family, secondarily for the domains of friendship and religion, and least of
all in those of education and employment, while the reverse held true for English."). See
also Fishman, The Sociology of Language: An Interdisciplinary Social Science Ap-
proach to Language in Society, in 1 ADVANCES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 217, 251
(J. Fishman ed. 1971) (stating that among bilinguals, Spanish is primarily associated
with family and friendship, which constitute the intimacy value cluster).
91. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270.
92. See id. at 269; Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th
Cir. 1975).
93. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269-70. Bilingualism can be considered as a spectrum of abili-
ties in a second language, ranging from a minimal ability to communicate in the second
language to equal facility in the second language. It is not necessarily the case, therefore,
that someone able to speak enough English to meet the minimum requirements of a job
is fully bilingual and able to express the full range of what needs to be conveyed to
conduct personal relationships with co-workers. See infra notes 95-101 and accompany-
ing text.
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Although not immutable in the same sense as race or sex, pri-
mary language is, for many persons, practically immutable. 4
Even the Garcia court conceded that "[t]o a person who speaks
only one tongue or to a person who has difficulty using another
language than the one spoken in his home, language might well
be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex or place of
birth.' '9 5 Moreover, acquiring a new language is especially diffi-
cult for adults with limited economic resources. 6
Studies of second-language acquisition demonstrate the diffi-
culty of acquiring English as a second language. One study, con-
ducted by Portes and Bach, examined the language acquisition
of a group of recent Mexican and Cuban male immigrants to the
United States.9 Despite spending six years in the United States
and despite instruction in English, over two-thirds (74.3%) of
the men studied gained essentially no knowledge of English or
only minimal English skills.9 " Another study focused on
Hispanic-origin males and females, aged fourteen and over, who
reported that Spanish was their mother tongue, the language
spoken in their homes when they were children.9 9 Of this sam-
ple, half of the studied group were still using Spanish as their
primary language.100 Other case studies show that, particularly
for older adolescents and adults, acquisition of English is quite
difficult; often the result is a bare, minimal level of competence
in communication. 1 It is a well-established proposition in the
psychology and sociology of language acquisition that the acqui-
94. See Note, Official English, supra note 81, at 1354-55. See also W. LONGSTREET,
ASPECTS OF ETHNICITY: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN PLURALISTIC CLASSROOMS 19-20
(1978) ("Individuals will eventually attain some intellectual control over their ethnically
learned behaviors, but that control is likely to remain incomplete. Much of what is
learned ethnically is done at a very low level of awareness and in a way that seems to
sidestep rationality."). The EEOC also recognizes that it is "common for individuals
whose primary language is not English to inadvertently change from speaking English to
speaking their primary language." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(c) (1989).
95. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 270.
96. Note, Official English, supra note 81, at 1354.
97. A. PORTES & R. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1985).
98. Id. at 174, 180, 198.
99. Grenier, Shifts to English as Usual Language by Americans of Spanish Mother
Tongue, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 346,
350 (1985).
100. Id. at 356. This study also found that Hispanics "are shifting to English at a
relatively fast pace." Id.
101. See Schumann, Second Language Acquisition: The Pidginization Hypothesis,
in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION: A BOOK OF READINGS 256-71 (E. Hatch ed. 1978); Sha-
pira, The Non-learning of English: Case Study of an Adult, in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUI-
SITION: A BOOK OF READINGS 246-55 (E. Hatch ed. 1978). Both articles present case stud-
ies of Spanish-speaking adults encountering great difficulty in acquiring English.
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sition and mastery of a new language is far more difficult for
adults than for children.0 2 Several theories attempt to explain
this phenomenon. One theory postulates a "critical period" after
which physiological changes in the brain make learning a second
language much more difficult.10 3 Another theory explains diffi-
culties in second-language acquisition by adults as the result of
the social and psychological distances between an individual
member of a social group and members of another social group
that speaks a different language.104 Social distance, which cre-
ates a poor language learning situation, exists when an individ-
ual's group is either dominant or subordinate to the group
speaking the desired language, when both groups desire preser-
vation of their values and cultural pattern and resist intermin-
gling, or when the two groups hold negative attitudes about each
other, among other factors. 05 One can infer a large degree of
social distance, and therefore poor language learning conditions,
between many persons whose primary language is not English
and the English-speaking majority culture based on differences
102. See Seliger, Implications of a Multiple Critical Periods Hypothesis for Second
Language Learning, in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION RESEARCH: ISSUES AND IMPLICA-
TIONS 11 (W. Ritchie ed. 1978) ("[Tlhe biological fact of adulthood is enough to establish
an insurmountable obstacle in most cases for complete language acquisition. The incom-
pleteness of the adult learner's [second-language] system has a physiological basis and
concomitant cognitive correlates."); Whitaker, Bilingualism: A Neurolinguistics Perspec-
tive, in SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION RESEARCH: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS 21, 29-30 (W.
Ritchie ed. 1978); Shapira, supra note 101, at 252-53. See also Schumann, supra note
101, at 259-67.
103. Professor Lenneberg first proposed this theory. He hypothesized that cerebral
dominance, and lateralization of the language functions of the brain to the left hemi-
sphere of the brain, was complete by puberty. See E. LENNEBERG, BIOLOGICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF LANGUAGE (1967); see also S. KRASHEN, SECOND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AND SEC-
OND LANGUAGE LEARNING 72 (1981) (describing Lenneberg's theory); Seliger, supra note
102, at 11-12; Whitaker, supra note 102, at 29-30. This critical period appears to end at
puberty. See Whitaker, supra note 102, at 29-30 ("Although there is evidence that under
unusual circumstances language acquisition may occur after puberty..., possibly by the
right hemisphere [of the brain], it is neither as rapid nor as successful as normal lan-
guage acquisition.") (citations omitted); S. KRASHEN, supra, at 72-73 ("[Tlhere seems to
be no question that puberty is an important turning point in language
acquisition .. ").
Several scholars question the critical period hypothesis. Krashen, while acknowledging
that differences in second language acquisition potential do exist between children and
adults, questions whether this difference is based on physiological or biological differ-
ences between children and adults. S. KRASHEN, supra, at 73, 81. See also Schumann,
supra note 101, at 259; Shapira, supra note 101, at 252; Snow & Hoefnagel-Hohle, The
Critical Period for Language Acquisition: Evidence from Second Language Learning, 49
CHILD DEV. 1114-28 (1978) (study failed to support the critical period hypothesis; fastest
second-language acquisition occurred in subjects aged 12-15 years, while the slowest oc-
curred in subjects aged 3-5 years).
104. Schumann, supra note 101, at 261-67.
105. Id. at 261-63.
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in socioeconomic status and educational level,' as well as on
the relative isolation of language minority persons in ethnic mi-
nority communities."°7
Success in acquiring a second language can also depend on the
psychological distance between the learner and the group speak-
ing the second language. s08 Psychological distance develops as a
language learner is haunted by doubts about his ability to ex-
press himself in a different language and when he finds that his
problem-solving abilities do not work in a new culture with a
different language. 09 An individual's motivation, dependent
upon his attitude toward English-speakers and his willingness to
adopt both linguistic and nonlinguistic aspects of their behavior,
is another important factor in his acquisition of a second lan-
guage." 0 Second-language acquisition, a complex and difficult
task under ideal conditions, is more difficult for members of lan-
guage minority groups, in part because of a long history of dis-
crimination against members of language minorities."' Many
106. See infra notes 114-15.
107. This isolation originates from a history of discrimination. See infra note 111.
108. Schumann, supra note 101, at 263-67.
109. Id.
110. R. GARDNER & W. LAMBERT, ATTITUDES AND MOTIVATION IN SECOND-LANGUAGE
LEARNING (1972). Gardner and Lambert state:
[E]thnocentric and prejudiced views held students back in various ways, where
widely shared negative stereotypes of certain peoples appeared to make the work
of a language teacher almost impossible, and where particular profiles of values
and motives seemed to make the difference between success and failure at school
work in general and language study in particular.
Id. at 144; see also Schumann, supra note 101, at 266-67. Schumann writes:
[F]actors causing psychological distance. . . put the learner in a situation where
he is largely cut off from [secondary] language input and/or does not attend to it
when it is available. The language which is acquired under these conditions will
be used simply for denotative referential communication in situations where
contact with speakers of the [secondary] language is either absolutely necessary
or unavoidable. . . [and] his use of the [secondary] language will be functionally
restricted ....
Id.
Prejudice against the language of Hispanics is recognized as a cause of low esteem for
the language. N. CONKLIN & M. LOURIE, supra note 72, at 193. "Spanish-influenced En-
glish is more often scorned than any other language variety in the Chicano verbal reper-
toire . . . . Neither Chicanos nor Anglos have much respect or affection for it." Id. at 192
(citation omitted). Attitudes such as these can only make the second language acquisi-
tion process more difficult and less successful.
111. There is a long history of discrimination against Mexican-Americans in employ-
ment. "[T]he pattern of employment of the Mexican American, dictated through the
discrimination encountered, has been the major factor contributing to the isolation of
the Mexican American from the majority population." Greenfield & Kates, Mexican
Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
662, 718 (1975) (footnote omitted). Mexican Americans have been paid lower starting
wages than Anglos, have suffered from curtailed opportunities for promotion, and have
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cases have recognized the systematic discrimination in public
education against Hispanic 12 and Asian u' s children. For many
been subject to discrimination from labor unions as well as employers. Id. at 719-20. "In
nearly all of the broad occupational classifications . . . Mexicans held poorer jobs paying
less money than did native American whites." J. MOORE, MEXICAN AMERICANS 61 (1st ed.
1970). Mexicans tend to hold the poorer and and lower paying jobs even within occupa-
tional categories. Id. at 62. Even if the representation of Mexican Americans and White
Americans were equal in the broad occupational categories, Mexicans would still get
lower pay than their Anglo counterparts doing similar work. Id. at 62.
In 1959, the median income of all Mexican Americans males in the Southwest United
States was only 57% of the median earned by Anglo males in the same area. Id. at 60. As
described by Professor Joan Moore:
It is perfectly obvious from the most superficial examination of the data that in
general Mexican Americans hold the less desirable jobs in the Southwest because
of lack of education, lack of business capital, cultural dissimilarity to the major-
ity, and their obvious role as a low-prestige group. Further, Mexicans are dispro-
portionately forced to work in low-wage or marginal firms-in the less profitable,
non-unionized fringes of the high-wage industries. Low job earnings are also as-
sociated with the concentration of Mexicans in certain low-wage geographical
areas, the lower Rio Grande valley of Texas being an example. (Of course, such
areas are "low-wage" partly because they are heavily Mexican.)
Id. at 63. A more recent study demonstrates that White Americans still fare better eco-
nomically than Mexican Americans or Black Americans. Verdugo & Verdugo, Earnings
Differentials Between Mexican American, Black, and White Male Workers, in THE
MEXICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 133 (1985).
[Wihites fared better than either blacks or Mexican Americans socioeconomi-
cally. Whites earned more, had completed more years of schooling, and worked
at far better jobs than either blacks or Mexican Americans. Whites also ap-
peared to be more fully employed as they worked more hours than either blacks
or Mexican Americans.
Id. at 136.
The under-representation of Hispanics in prestigious and highly paid jobs continues
into the present. See, e.g., Davila, The Underrepresentation of Hispanic Attorneys in
Corporate Law Firms, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1987):
Despite many advances, minority representation in the legal profession, as in
most prestigious fields, is still not proportionate to the minority presence in the
general population. But even within the legal world, corporate law firms have
been slower than other professional groups in moving toward a more proportion-
ate racial balance. . . . One survey reported that Hispanics represent less than 1
percent of the attorneys in the 151 biggest law firms in the United States.
Id. at 1404 (footnotes omitted). Hispanics in corporate law firms often experience a
strong sense of isolation within the firms. Id. at 1415. "[T]his sense of isolation may be
rooted in the fact that the Hispanic attorneys' backgrounds and value systems differ so
radically from those of their white counterparts." Id. Cf. Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d
1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated as moot, 484 U.S. 806 (1987) ("[Clourts have long
recognized the history of discriminatory treatment inflicted on Thinese and Hispanic
people.") (citations omitted). Many courts have observed such discrimination against
Chinese and Hispanic people. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-82 (1954)
(holding that persons of Mexican descent were discriminated against in jury selection);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (holding that Chinese persons were
discriminated against by municipal ordinance regulating public laundries).
112. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973); Cisneros v. Corpus
Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); United States v.
Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 853 (5th Cir. 1972) (en banc); Soria v. Oxnard School
Dist., 328 F. Supp. 157 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see generally, Greenfield & Kates, supra note
111, at 711-15 (1975); Rangel & Alcalo, Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos
in Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 379 (1972).
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years, state and local officials refused to offer equal educational
opportunities to members of language minority groups."1 4 Ac-
cording to the Senate Report accompanying the 1975 amend-
ments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, "[plersons of Spanish
heritage are the group most severely affected by discriminatory
practices, while the documentation of discriminatory practices
concerning Asian Americans ...was substantial." '15
1215, 1215-16 (1971) (stating that a California statute authorized separate schools for
children of Asian descent until its repeal in 1947).
114. See S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 774, 794 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
The history of discrimination against members of language minority groups begins
early: in the schools. It begins with the banning of languages other than English from the
classroom. As one scholar has observed, "[in 1919 fifteen states decreed that English
must be the sole language of instruction in all primary schools, public and private." J.
HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at 260 (2d
ed. 1988). The Nebraska statute, which stated that "[n]o person . . shall ... teach any
subject to any person in any language other than the English language," was applied to
prohibit teaching in the German language. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923).
In Louisiana, educators banned the use of French in the classroom. See Comment, supra
note 81, at 1154-55. French-speaking students were severely punished when they spoke
their primary language in school. Id. Spanish, too, was banned from the classroom. In
Texas, as in other parts of the Southwestern United States, "Mexican-American children
were prohibited from speaking their native language anywhere on school grounds. Those
who violated the 'No Spanish' rule were severely punished." United States v. Texas, 506
F. Supp 405, 412 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 680 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1982);
J. MOORE, supra note 111, at 84. The punishment included corporal punishment. Id.
"[Als late as the 1950s children who spoke Spanish in school were made to kneel on
upturned bottle caps, forced to hold bricks in outstretched hands in the schoolyard, or
told to put their nose in a chalk circle drawn on a blackboard. And this would happen in
Texas towns that were 98 percent Spanish-speaking." T. WEYR, supra note 12, at 52.
The forcible suppression of other languages in schools was accompanied by the segre-
gation of children from language minority groups in separate and unequal schools. See J.
MOORE, supra note 111, at 81; see, e.g., United States v. Texas, 506 F. Supp. at 411
("[Slegregation of Mexican Americans is a historical fact in Texas public schools.");
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 197-98 (1973); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at
479 (1954); Greenfield & Kates, supra note 111, at 714 & n.299 (1975); see generally
Rangel & Alcalo, supra note 112.
During the enactment in 1975 of amendments to the Voting Rights Act, Congress
found widespread discrimination against language minority citizens and recognized this
as a denial of equal educational opportunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1) (1982); cf. Lau
v. Nichols, 414 U.S. at 568 (1974) (holding that Chinese children taught in English-only
classes were denied equal educational opportunity).
115. SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at 797. The isolation of language minority stu-
dents in segregated, inferior schools, and the suppression of their primary languages, has
resulted in low educational attainment and a very high dropout rate for such students.
These effects are well documented in the case of Mexican American and other Hispanic
children. In 1960, the median number of years of education completed was 12.1 for An-
glos, but only 7.1 for Spanish-surname students. J. MOORE, supra note 111, at 68 (Table
4-2). In 1970, the problem of low educational attainment was still severe. According to
WINTER 1990] English-Only Rules
The courts and the Congress have recognized and responded
to the difficulties faced by persons of limited English-speaking
ability. Indeed, one can imply the practical immutability of
one's primary language from the numerous judicial and statu-
tory accommodations to persons whose primary language is not
English. For example, in Lau v. Nichols,116 the Supreme Court
interpreted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964117 to require
a school district to provide language assistance to overcome bar-
riers faced by children whose primary language was Chinese and
who spoke no English."' In other settings, the courts have held
that non-English speakers are entitled to affirmative voting as-
sistance,11 to translators in criminal proceedings, 120 and to relief
from a default judgment entered because the defendant, unable
to speak or read English, failed to answer a complaint. 2 '
Congress also enacted laws designed to accommodate persons
whose primary language is not English. In perhaps the most im-
portant accommodation, Congress in 1975 extended the coverage
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965122 to include language minori-
the 1970 Census, only 5.5% of the general population over 25 had failed to complete five
years of school, compared with more than 18.9% of Hispanic citizens over 25. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 114, at 794. In Texas, over 33% of Mexican American citizens had
failed to complete the fifth grade. Id. Over half of the Mexican American children in
Texas who enter the first grade never finish high school. Id. "In 1981, 30 percent of the
Hispanic 18 and 19-year-olds were not high school graduates, a significantly higher drop-
out rate than [for] white or black students." H. R. REP. No. 748, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4036, 4040 (legislative history
of the Education Amendments of 1984, including the Bilingual Education Act). Lest one
consider this a problem wholly of the past, the very high dropout rate for Hispanic
youngsters, currently measured at 50 percent in the Boston schools, for example, remains
a serious source of concern and a major problem in 1988. See Ribadeneira, Hispanics
Demand a Better Effort by City Schools: Parents Blame High Dropout Rate on Indif-
ference, Boston Globe, Nov. 21, 1988, at 15, col. 1; Ribadeneira, Boom Bypassing Mass.
Hispanics, Boston Globe, June 5, 1988, at 41, col. 1 (Massachusetts state dropout rate
for Hispanics about 56%; in Boston, about 51%).
To the extent that English is learned in the schools, these high dropout rates support
the argument that, for those students whose primary language is not English, primary
language is practically immutable.
116. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) (prohibiting discrimination based on national origin in
programs receiving federal financial assistance).
118. See also Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 1974).
119. Puerto Rican Org. for Political Action v. Kusper, 350 F. Supp. 606, 611-12 (N.D.
Ill. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1973). See Note, Official English, supra -note 81, at
1349 & n.31.
120. United States ex. rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 390-91 (2d Cir. 1970).
See Note, Official English, supra note 81, at 1350 & n.33.
121. Cota v. Southern Arizona Bank & Trust Co., 17 Ariz. App. 326, 497 P.2d 833
(1972).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (1982).
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ties. 2 ' Congress found that "voting discrimination against citi-
zens of language minorities is pervasive and national in scope.
Such minority citizens are from environments in which the dom-
inant language is other than English."' 24 Congress concluded
that "where state and local officials conduct elections only in
English, language minority citizens are excluded from participat-
ing in the electoral process." '125 To remedy this exclusion, Con-
gress required state and political subdivisions to provide voting
materials, instructions, and ballots "in the language of the appli-
cable language minority group as well as in the English lan-
guage."' 26 Congress recognized, therefore, the substantial barri-
ers blocking effective participation in the electoral process for
persons whose primary language differs from English.
Congress has taken other affirmative steps to assist language
minorities. In the Bilingual Education Act,' 27 Congress provided
financial assistance for local bilingual projects designed to assist
children and adults whose primary language is not English and
whose abilities in English are limited. As part of the Bilingual
Education Act, Congress recognized "that there are large and
growing numbers of children of limited English proficiency...
many of [whom] . . . have a cultural heritage which differs from
that of English proficient persons.' 28 Congress also was aware
that "because of limited English proficiency, many adults are
not able to participate fully in national life, and that limited En-
glish proficient parents are often not able to participate effec-
tively in their children's education.
'12 9
In its regulations implementing the Bilingual Education Act,
the Department of Education recognizes explicitly the difficul-
ties faced by individuals whose primary language is different
from English. The department defined "limited English profi-
ciency" individuals as including those "not born in the United
States or whose native language is other than English" or who
come "from a home in which a language other than English is
used most for communication .... 130 When such a person
123. Voting Rights Act Extension of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1) (1982).
125. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1982).
127. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3341 (1988).
128. Id. § 3282(a)(I)-(2) (1988).
129. Id. § 3282(a)(19) (1988); see also H. REP. No. 748, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4036, 4042.
130. 34 C.F.R. § 500.4(b)(1)(i)-(ii) (1988). In 1989, the department formally adopted
the definitions in the Bilingual Education Act. 34 C.F.R. § 500.4(b) (1989). These defini-
tions contain the same language. See 20 U.S.C. § 3283(a) (1988).
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"has sufficient difficulty in speaking, reading, writing or under-
standing the English language" [that they cannot] [p]articipate
fully in our society," the person has "limited English
proficiency.'
1 31
A number of other federal statutes require the use of different
languages in a variety of contexts, covering situations such as
the use of interpreters in the courtroom,' the use of foreign
languages at federally funded migrant and community health
centers,' 33 and in federal alcohol abuse and treatment
programs.'
34
Judges and lawmakers recognize, therefore, that full participa-
tion in important aspects of American life is difficult for persons
with a different primary language. Access to voting, education,
and simple justice is limited severely for many Americans unless
these rights and services are provided in languages understood
by them. These many accommodations to persons of different
primary language imply that a different primary language, if not
completely immutable, is at least practically immutable for
many Americans to a degree that inhibits full functioning in so-
ciety. The practically immutable nature of a primary language is
the unstated premise of many of these laws, for if one's primary
language could be so easily changed-if English could be so eas-
ily acquired-then there would be little need for national laws
guaranteeing that basic rights will be communicated in different
languages and so made available to many Americans.
D. Garcia v. Gloor-The Wrong Path
The Garcia court's conclusion that Title VII does not support
an interpretation that equates an employee's primary language
with his national origin'3 5 is therefore misguided for several rea-
sons. The courts and the EEOC have extended the protection of
Title VII to bar discrimination against persons who have charac-
teristics that are closely correlated with national origin. 36 Pri-
131. 34 C.F.R. § 500.4(b)(2) (1988).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d) (1982); see Note, Official English, supra note 81, at 1350 &
n.37.
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 254b(f)(3)(J), 254c(e)(3)(J) (1982); see Note, Official English,
supra note 81, at 1350 & n.37.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 4577(b)(3)(1982); see Note, Official English, supra note 81, at 1350
& n.37.
135. Garcia v. Gloor 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
136. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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mary language or mother tongue-English for most Americans,
and Spanish, German, Italian, French, Polish, Yiddish and other
languages for many Americans'37-is one of the most important
aspects of ethnic identity and national origin. 138 As such, it is
properly protected under Title VII as a characteristic closely
correlated and inextricably related to national origin. 139 In par-
ticular, the courts and the EEOC already protect linguistic char-
acteristics such as foreign accent under the statute.140 It is diffi-
cult to discern a reason for protecting one's foreign accent under
the statute while denying protection to one's primary language,
the fundamental ethnic trait that gave rise to the accent.
The Garcia court also reasoned that a bilingual employee's de-
sire to speak his primary language is not an immutable charac-
teristic like place of birth, race or sex. 14 The foregoing analysis
demonstrates, however, that for many persons primary language
is practically immutable. Indeed, even the Garcia court recog-
nized that language might be immutable for persons who speak
only one language or who have difficulty with languages other
than their mother tongue.
142
The established difficulty of second-language acquisition for
language minorities in this country and the recognition by the
courts and Congress of the need to accommodate persons whose
primary language is not English provide compelling evidence
that primary language is practically immutable. The practical
immutability of primary language justifies its protection under
Title VII.
137. These are the six languages other than English most frequently claimed as
mother tongues in the United States as reported in 1970 and 1979 Bureau of the Census
data. J. FISHMAN, supra note 17, at 111, 145-48.
138. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
139. See Note, supra note 58, at 1166 ("Courts should therefore employ a definition
of national origin discrimination which includes the concept of discrimination on the
basis of national origin-linked (i.e., cultural) traits.") (footnote omitted).
140. See supra notes 62 and 69 and accompanying text.
141. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
142. Id. The plaintiff in Garcia, Hector Garcia, testified during the trial that he had
difficulty following Gloor Lumber's rule because Spanish was his primary language. Be-
cause of his primary language, Garcia tended to speak Spanish inadvertently and had to
think carefully before speaking English because he might give the wrong impression at
times and could not always express himself fluently. Brief for the EEOC at 3-4, Garcia v.
Gloor, 625 F.2d 1016 (5th Cir. 1980) (No. 77-2358) (petition for rehearing). Despite Gar-
cia's difficulty in expressing himself in English, the Garcia court did not find that his
primary language was immutable. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 272 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
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III. THE "EXCLUSIVE ADVERSE IMPACT" OF ENGLISH-ONLY
RULES
Having established that one's primary language closely corre-
lates with national origin and that its use is entitled to protec-
tion under Title VII, we must then determine the proper analy-
sis to apply to restrictions imposed upon the exercise of one's
primary language. Although few courts have addressed the legal-
ity of English-only rules, the EEOC has advocated 4 3 the use of
the disparate impact theory developed in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co."" The Gutierrez court, adopting the EEOC's analysis, ana-
lyzed the municipal court's English-only rule under a disparate
impact theory. 45
The disparate impact theory applies when a plaintiff demon-
strates that a specific, facially neutral employment policy has a
discriminatory impact on protected groups.4 ' An English-only
rule is a specific and identifiable employment practice, as re-
quired by Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.147 Application of
the disparate impact theory to the analysis of English-only rules
also rests on the assumption that an English-only rule is a
facially neutral employment policy. This assumption, not ques-
tioned by the litigants or the courts in Garcia and Gutierrez, or
by the EEOC, has superficial appeal. It can be argued that an
English-only rule applies equally to all employees in that every
employee must speak English.
An English-only rule, however, differs in kind from the
facially neutral rules usually analyzed under the disparate im-
pact model. Facially neutral rules are facially neutral because
they operate to disqualify members of both the majority class
and the protected minority class. Thus, in Griggs, the neutral
selection devices of a high school diploma or general intelligence
tests would disqualify at least some Whites as well as Blacks.""
143. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. No. 81-25, 27 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1820 (1981);
EEOC Dec. No. 72-0281, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6293 (1971).
144. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The application of the disparate impact theory, particularly
the allocation of burdens of proof under the theory, has been cf -nged significantly by
the recent decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989). See
infra notes 182-95 and accompanying text.
145. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1040, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct.
1736 (1989).
146. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2119, 2124; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (stating that Title
VII "proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation").
147. 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124 (1989).
148. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
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In Dothard v. Rawlinson,149 the facially neutral statutory height
and weight requirements would disqualify at least some men as
well as women. 150 Accordingly, such facially neutral devices show
fairness in form, if not in results. Only when the neutral rule
disqualifies a disproportionate number of members of a pro-
tected class does a disparate impact exist.
Now consider the impact of an English-only rule. No member
of the majority class will ever be disqualified because of the op-
eration of the rule. An English-only rule will never have any ad-
verse impact on persons whose primary language is English. 5'
The only persons disqualified are members of protected groups
whose primary language is not English.'52 The rule's full impact
falls exclusively upon members of protected groups. Accordingly,
English-only rules have no claim to the fairness in form of other
rules analyzed under disparate impact theory.'53 Rather than
characterizing them inaccurately as "facially neutral," English-
only rules should be described as having an exclusive adverse
impact that constitutes the "functional equivalent" of national
origin discrimination. 54
Outside the Title VII context, courts already recognize such
an adverse impact upon citizens whose primary language is not
English. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,'55 decided in 1926, the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Philippine law
prohibiting Chinese merchants from keeping their business ac-
count books in Chinese, the only language the merchants knew.
Finding that the enforcement of the law's criminal penalties
against the Chinese merchants "would seriously embarrass all of
them and would drive out of business a great number,"' 56 the
149. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
150. See id. at 329-30.
151. Although it is possible to conceive of a few situations in which persons whose
primary language is English could be affected by an English-only rule, for example, if
someone studying Spanish wanted to practice Spanish with Spanish-speaking co-workers
in the workplace, such situations seem few and trivial. Furthermore, in such a situation
there would probably be no correlation between Spanish and such a person's national
origin, so there would be no national origin discrimination implicated in limiting such a
student's use of Spanish in the workplace.
152. See Note, Official English, supra note 81, at 1353.
153. See 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 73.41 (1987)
("As to English language tests, when the issue is one of national origin discrimination
they probably are not entitled to be called neutral at all.").
154. See Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 298-99
(1971); Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate Impact Liability Under
Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911, 923 (1979) (authored by Marcus B. Chandler) (citing
"functional equivalence" theory of Professor Owen Fiss).
155. 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
156. Id. at 514-15.
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Court held that the law denied to Chinese persons due process
and equal protection of the laws. 157 More recently, in Serna v.
Portales Municipal Schools,' the court recognized the negative
effect of language and cultural restrictions on school children,
heeding expert testimony 59 that "a child who goes to a school
where he finds no evidence of his language and culture and eth-
nic group represented becomes withdrawn and nonparticipat-
ing. '"160 There is little reason to assume that these negative ef-
fects are much different when English-only rules are imposed
upon adults whose primary language is not English.'61 One court
has recognized recently that the chilling effect upon the Span-
ish-language speech of Hispanics caused by a state Official-
English law is a constitutionally redressable injury, violating the
first amendment of the U.S. Constitution.'62
The United States Senate, in its report on the extension of the
Voting Rights Act to include language minority citizens, re-
viewed the adverse effects of English-only elections upon lan-
guage minority groups.6 3 While the issues involved in English-
only elections may be somewhat different from those involved in
considering an English-only rule in the workplace,6 the result-
ing discouragement, frustration and inhibition of people subject
to the rule are the same. Recognizing these adverse effects upon
adults, the EEOC published regulations describing the effect of
English-only rules:
Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace,
from speaking their primary language or the language
they speak most comfortably, disadvantages an individ-
ual's employment opportunities on the basis of national
origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority,
isolation and intimidation based on national origin which
could result in a discriminatory working environment.'65
157. Id. at 524-25.
158. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
159. Serna, 351 F. Supp. at 1282.
160. Serna, 499 F.2d at 1150 (summarizing district court expert testimony).
161. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
162. See Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990) (invalidating Arizona's
English-only law as violating the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
163. SENATE REPORT, supra note 114, at 790-97.
164. Cf. id. at 792, 796. In Gutierrez, the court noted that the English-only rule
greatly disturbed Hispanic employees. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1036,
vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
165. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1989) (footnote omitted).
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Although a limited English-only rule is less burdensome than a
complete prohibition on the use of one's primary language, the
negative effects of a more limited rule will differ only in degree,
not in kind, from those of a complete prohibition.
One should not assume that these effects are different for bi-
lingual persons. Primary language can be a crucial aspect of the
ethnicity of a bilingual person.16 The term "bilingualism" is de-
fined as the ability "to speak two languages with nearly equal
facility."' 7 Because of the practical immutability of primary
language, and the factors contributing to practical immutabil-
ity,"' many persons whose primary language is not English are
not bilingual, although they may be thought to be so if they
have any ability to communicate in English. It is more realistic
to consider bilingualism as a spectrum of abilities in a second
language ranging from minimal ability to communicate in a sec-
ond language to equal facility in two languages. For persons with
limited English proficiency, who are "bilingual" only to a limited
extent, a restriction on their ability to speak their primary lan-
guages may be a serious handicap tantamount to the effect of a
restriction forcing a right-handed person to write left-handed.
Those who are more fully bilingual still suffer the adverse ef-
fects of a restriction on their ability to speak their primary lan-
guages. The sociological and psychological factors that make pri-
mary language a crucial aspect of ethnicity 6 9 are also relevant
for more fully bilingual persons. Their links to their "own peo-
ple," their sense of ethnic identity, and their ability to enjoy a
full range of verbal expression in relationships with bilingual co-
workers depend heavily on their ability to use their primary lan-
guage. For bilinguals, then, as well as for those who speak only
their mother tongue, the exclusive adverse impact of English-
only rules warrants a high burden on employers to justify their
discriminatory rules.
IV. THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR EXCLUSIVE ADVERSE IMPACT
UNDER TITLE VII
In light of the exclusive impact of English-only rules upon
protected groups, the business justification standard recently an-
166. See supra notes 74-80 & 89-90 and accompanying text.
167. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 133 (1972).
168. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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nounced in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio170 is inappropri-
ate. Under Wards Cove, employers only have the burden of pro-
ducing evidence of a business justification that significantly
serves some legitimate employment goal.17' The exclusive ad-
verse impact of English-only rules upon language minorities
raises the issue of whether the traditional disparate impact the-
ory, as modified by Wards Cove Packing Co., is the most appro-
priate model for analyzing such rules.
A. English-Only Rules As Disparate Treatment on the Basis
of National Origin
A restriction on the use of one's primary language such as an
English-only rule should be analyzed as disparate treatment on
the basis of national origin. Discrimination on the basis of pri-
mary language is equivalent to discrimination on the basis of na-
tional origin, both because of the very close correlation between
primary language and national origin and the exclusive adverse
impact of restrictions upon the use of primary languages other
than English. The intent necessary to show disparate treatment
can be inferred from the existence of such exclusive adverse
effects.
172
The statutory treatment under Title VII of pregnancy, a char-
acteristic exclusively associated with women, supports the view
that restrictions on the use of primary languages other than En-
170. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
171. Id. at 2125-26.
172. Cf. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (" 'Disparate treat-
ment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situa-
tions be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.") (emphasis added);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) Regarding a constitutional attack on equal
protection grounds against a test used to select police recruits, the Court wrote
Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears
more heavily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the
discriminatory impact . . . may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconsti-
tutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult
to explain on nonracial grounds. ...
Id. at 242. Justice Stevens's concurrence is also supportive. Id. at 253 ("Frequently the
most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally
the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds."). For
further discussion of disparate treatment see M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN, & R. RICHARDS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 86-94 (2d ed. 1988).
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glish should be treated the same as discrimination because of
national origin. In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by adding
section 701(k), which provides, in part, that "[t]he terms 'be-
cause of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical condition; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes.
173
Congress enacted this amendment to overrule General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert,1 74 in which the Supreme Court concluded
that a benefit plan that discriminated on the basis of pregnancy
did not discriminate because of sex in violation of Title VII. The
amendment adopted the views of the dissenting Justices, who
recognized the exclusive adverse effect of discrimination because
of pregnancy upon women and who found that such discrimina-
tion violated Title VII.17 5 The House Report accompanying the
amendment concluded that "the dissenting Justices correctly in-
terpreted the Act.
'176
Accordingly, a correct interpretation of Title VII requires
treating characteristics that are closely correlated with a pro-
tected characteristic the same as the explicitly protected charac-
teristic when such characteristics are used as the basis for dis-
crimination that results in an exclusive adverse effect upon a
protected group. Just as the dissenting Justices in Gilbert and
members of Congress recognized that discrimination because of
pregnancy is the same as discrimination because of sex, so
should the courts recognize that discrimination because of pri-
mary language is the same as discrimination because of national
origin. A proper interpretation of Title VII requires that restric-
tions on the exercise of primary languages other than English be
analyzed as disparate treatment because of national origin.
If restrictions upon primary languages other than English are
analyzed as discrimination because of national origin, then em-
173. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978)
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
174. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
175. Id. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (adopting the EEOC's view that the plan
violates Title VII "because the omission of pregnancy from the program has the intent
and effect of providing that 'only women [are subjected] to a substantial risk of total loss
of income because of temporary medical disability' ") (quoting Brief for EEOC at 12); id.
at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he rule at issue places the risk of absence caused by
pregnancy in a class by itself. By definition, such a rule discriminates on account of sex;
for it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from
the male.") (footnote omitted).
176. H. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4749, 4750.
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ployers can only justify such restrictions under the bona fide oc-
cupational qualification (BFOQ) defense. 17 7 The Supreme Court
has described the BFOQ defense as "an extremely narrow excep-
tion to the general prohibition of discrimination. ' 178 It is the
employer's burden to establish the BFOQ defense by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, proving the "reasonable necessity" of
policies that discriminate on the basis of national origin.179 Fur-
thermore, the discrimination must be reasonably necessary to
the essence of the employer's business. 8 '
The courts should require employers utilizing English-only
rules to prove that their rules are necessary under the strict
standards of the BFOQ defense, rather than under the permis-
sive standard of Wards Cove. The functional equivalence of pri-
mary language and national origin warrants imposing upon em-
ployers the burden of proving that restrictions on languages
meet the standards of the BFOQ defense. English-only rules
merit close examination" from courts because of the ease with
which employers can use such rules as a pretext to keep Hispan-
ics, and other language minority groups, out of the work force. 81
B. Disparate Impact Theory and Exclusive Adverse Impact
Under the disparate impact theory, as interpreted most re-
cently in Wards Cove, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the adverse effect of a particular rule or employ-
177. Section 703(c) of Title VII describes the defense, stating that "it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees. . . on the
basis of ...national origin in those certain instances where . ..national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982) (emphasis added).
178. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
179. Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985).
180. Id. at 419; Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1971) ("[D]iscrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively.").
181. The discharge of Hector Garcia from Gloor Lumber illustrates how enforcement
of such rules can keep members of language minorities out of the work force. See Garcia
v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). See also
Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989). The Fragante court stated:
Accent and national origin are obviously inextricably intertwined in many cases.
It would therefore be an easy refuge in this context for an employer unlawfully
discriminating against someone based on national origin to state falsely that it
was not the person's national origin that caused the employment or promotion
problem, but the candidate's inability to measure up to the communication skills
demanded by the job. We encourage a very searching look by the district courts
at such a claim.
Id. at 596 (footnote omitted).
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ment practice on a protected group. 182 The plaintiff must iden-
tify a specific employment practice or rule that results in a dis-
parate impact. 83 If the plaintiff successfully demonstrates the
adverse impact of a specific employment practice, then the in-
quiry shifts to a consideration of the business justification of-
fered by the employer for its practice.8 4 The inquiry consists of
a reasoned review of the employer's asserted justification. 85 The
challenged practice must serve, in a significant way, the legiti-
mate employment goals of the employer.'86 The employer carries
only the burden of producing evidence of a business justification
for his employment practice. 87 The plaintiff bears the burden of
persuading the court that the employer's proffered justification
is invalid.188 If the trier of fact concludes that the employer's
business justification is valid, then the plaintiff may still prevail
if he can demonstrate the availability of alternative employment
practices that would accomplish the employer's goals with less
adverse impact.'89 If the plaintiff can show that such alternatives
exist, or that the employer's asserted business justification is a
pretext, then the plaintiff prevails. 9 °
The Court in Wards Cove thus revised the burden imposed
upon an employer seeking to establish a business justification.
Under the old standard the employer bore the burden of proving
182. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2124-25 (1989); Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2784 (1988); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 329 (1977). See also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 1287, 1324-25.
183. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124.
184. Id. at 2125.
185. Id. at 2126.
186. Id. at 2125-26.
187. Id. at 2126. The recent decision in Wards Cove represents a radical departure
from the previously settled distribution of burdens of proof in a disparate impact case.
Prior to Wards Cove if a plaintiff successfully proved the disparate impact of an em-
ployer's practice, then the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to prove that its
practice was justified by business necessity. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2791-97 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that burden of
proof passes to defendant to establish that employment practice is a business necessity);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (holding employer required to "prov[e]
that the challenged requirements are job related"); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (same); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (stating
that Congress placed on the employer the burden of showing that the challenged require-
ment bears a "manifest relationship to the employment in question").
188. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
189. Id. at 2126-27; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425. See
also B. SCHLI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 1287.
190. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27; Dothard, 433 U.S. at 332; McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361,
368 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975)); Robin-
son v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798-800 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub noma.
Tobacco Workers Int'l Union v. Robinson, 404 U.S. 1007 (1972).
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the job-relatedness of an employment practice. 1 ' This so-called
"business necessity" standard received criticism for being varied
and inconsistent.192 The new standard created in Wards Cove
imposes only a burden of production on the employer to present
some evidence of business justification. This is apparently the
slightest burden ever imposed upon employers under the dispa-
rate impact theory.' Although evidence of an insubstantial bus-
iness justification is not sufficient to meet the employer's bur-
den, 94 an employer no longer needs to prove that a challenged
rule or practice is essential to good job performance. 9 5 Now it is
up to the employee to disprove the alleged business justification.
The Supreme Court, in developing its standards in disparate
impact cases, has evaluated standardized employment tests and
criteria' 96 and subjective employment criteria,197 all of which can
191. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also B. SCHLEI & P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 1328-29.
192. Commentators and courts have remarked on the varied and inconsistent stan-
dards applied to employers attempting to establish a business necessity defense. See
Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination,
73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1312 (1987) ("[D]isarray ... has resulted in the federal courts from
uncertainty over what the defense requires the defendant to prove."); Comment, supra
note 154, at 912 ("[L]ower courts have been afforded a considerable degree of freedom in
shaping the contours of the defense."); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 1328-
29 & n.139; see also Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-76 (9th Cir.
1981) ("[Clourts differ on just what an employer must prove to discharge its burden.").
There is little reason to assume that the application of the new business justification
standards established by Wards Cove, will be any more uniform than the application of
the old business necessity standard.
193. Wards Cove creates essentially the same burden of proof for an employer under
a disparate impact case that exists for a disparate treatment case. Under the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green disparate treatment model, the employer must only "articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection," and the burden
then shifts to the plaintiff, who must then demonstrate that the articulated reason is a
pretext. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). The burden of
production imposed upon employers by Wards Cove, and the "reasoned review" of the
employer's asserted justification, is only slightly more onerous a burden than the mere
articulation of a legitimate reason for a business practice.
194. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126.
195. This is another example of how Wards Cove has lessened significantly the bur-
den of proof on employers. Prior to the decision, employers were required to prove that a
challenged practice or rule was essential to good job performance. See, e.g., Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431
(1975) (holding that discriminatory tests must be proven to be " 'predictive of or signifi-
cantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are rele-
vant to the job' ") (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1974)); Craig v. County of Los Ange-
les, 626 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981).
196. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2785 (1988)
("[Elach of our subsequent decisions, however, like Griggs itself, involved standardized
employment tests or criteria."); see, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (writ-
ten examination); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (policy
against employing persons using narcotic drugs, including methadone); Dothard v. Rawl-
inson, 433 U. S. 321 (1977) (height and weight requirements); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976) (written test of verbal skills); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
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be characterized as facially neutral in the sense described ear-
lier.198 The disparate impact theory, however, should not apply
to English-only rules because such rules are not facially neutral
and because they have an exclusive adverse impact. 9 ' The
courts, nevertheless, will probably continue to apply this famil-
iar theory to such rules. Even under the disparate impact the-
ory, though, courts should recognize the exclusive impact and
hold employers to a higher standard of business necessity.
20 0
Rules that are not facially neutral warrant a different analysis
under the disparate impact theory, with a correspondingly
higher burden of justification required from employers seeking
to use them. The exclusive adverse impact of English-only rules
on language minority groups justifies at least a return to the for-
mer burdens of proof under the business necessity defense,
which required an employer to prove the business necessity for a
challenged practice.2 0 1 This exclusive adverse impact also justi-
fies a more substantial burden upon employers, such as requir-
ing employers using English-only rules to prove that such rules
are the least discriminatory alternative that will accomplish
their legitimate goals.20 2
English-only rules warrant very close examination by the
courts because of the ease with which employers can discrimi-
nate against language minority groups through the use of such
rules.203 Such a close examination is appropriate especially in
light of past discrimination against language minorities.20 4 Em-
ployers also can use these rules to subject such groups to disci-
pline and consequently reduced job opportunities. Furthermore,
198. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
200. In contrast to a practice with an exclusive impact, the disparate impact theory
that originated in Griggs was meant to analyze employer practices that were "fair in
form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971).
201. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2130 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. See Rutherglen, supra note 192, at 1326 (employment practices with larger ad-
verse impact should be harder to justify than practices with little impact). See also
Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. To-
bacco Workers Int'l Union v. Robinson, 404 U.S. 1007 (1972) ("[Tihere must be available
no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the busi-
ness purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial im-
pact.") (footnote omitted).
203. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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such rules may discourage otherwise qualified applicants from
applying for positions with employers utilizing such rules. The
danger of applying a permissive standard of review, such as that
articulated in Wards Cove, to English-only rules is that "such a
low standard of review would permit discrimination to be prac-
ticed through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment
practices.'205
V. ENGLISH-ONLY RULES UNDER THE DISPARATE IMPACT
THEORY: THE CURRENT STANDARD APPLIED
Courts may continue to analyze English-only rules under the
disparate impact theory, as modified by Wards Cove. Even
under the current disparate impact theory, however, analysis of
justifications offered by employers for English-only rules demon-
strates that the rules often will not pass muster. The following
section analyzes common justifications offered by employers for
English-only rules.
Even if primary language is recognized as a characteristic of
national origin protected under Title VII, the right to speak
one's primary language is not absolute. Rather, it is a right
bounded by the actual requirements of the job and the business
at issue. In certain situations, it is clearly inappropriate for
someone to speak a language other than English in the work-
place.20 6 If a bilingual, Spanish-speaking salesperson insisted on
speaking in Spanish to a prospective customer who spoke only
English, leading to a lost transaction, the employer could prop-
erly discipline this salesperson for failing to do his job. Similarly,
a bilingual stage actor cast in the role of Hamlet would not have
a right to deliver the soliloquy in Spanish, unless the production
called for such a delivery. The actor's and the salesman's use of
primary language would constitute poor performance, and the
employer could properly discipline or discharge a poorly per-
forming employee. In such a situation, it is not the language that
needs regulation, but rather the job performance. °7
205. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. It is ironic that these words were written by the
Court in Wards Cove, which has made it easier for employers to justify seemingly neu-
tral employment practices.
206. See, e.g., Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding no violation of Title VII in the discharge of a bilingual radio announcer who
refused to comply with the station program director's instructions to broadcast only in
English).
207. Accordingly, if one Hispanic, bilingual salesperson insisted on speaking Spanish
to English-speaking customers, the appropriate regulation would be exactly the same
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Business justification, however, means more than mere busi-
ness convenience or preference.2 " The challenged practice must
serve "in a significant way" the legitimate employment goals of
the employer.0 9 Accordingly, the challenged practice or rule
must carry out the business purpose asserted by the employer
effectively and objectively.2 1 If a plaintiff can show that less dis-
criminatory alternatives exist that would accomplish the em-
ployer's purpose equally well or more effectively with less ad-
verse impact, this proof undermines the justification for the
employer's practice.2" These principles limit, therefore, the po-
tentially acceptable purposes for which employers can enact
English-only rules as well as the scope of these rules.
The cases decided by the courts and the EEOC reveal a vari-
ety of justifications offered by employers to defend their use of
English-only rules. Employers have claimed that such rules re-
duce the racial tension and fear experienced by customers or fel-
low employees who do not understand conversations in lan-
guages other than English.2 12 One employer argued that these
kind of discipline that would be meted out to any other employee who performed poorly
in a similar manner, say by ignoring customer requests or by being rude. Such poor per-
formance by a bilingual employee would not be grounds for an English-only rule, prohib-
iting conversations between employees who would understand each other, but would be
grounds for whatever discipline is ordinarily imposed for poor performance.
208. See, e.g., Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126 (stating that a "mere insubstantial
justification . . will not suffice"); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th
Cir. 1979) ("Administrative convenience is not a sufficient justification for the employer's
practices."); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir.
1971) (stating that "management convenience and business necessity are not syno-
nomous"); see also B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 359.
209. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
210. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed sub nom. Tobacco Workers
Int'l Union v. Robinson, 404 U.S. 1007 (1972); Rutherglen, supra note 192, at 1321 (de-
fense of business justification deals with objective reasons for an employment practice);
cf. Comment, supra note 154, at 934 ("[Sltandard of job-relatedness is an objective
one. . . . [O]nly if the practice in fact serves business purposes can it be deemed
necessary.' ").
211. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27. See Rutherglen, supra note 192, at 1327-28
("[I1f the defendant has not considered an alternative . . . procedure with obviously
greater validity, then it has undermined the procedure that it did choose."); cf. Williams
v. Colorado Springs, Colo., School Dist. #11, 641 F.2d 835, 841 (10th Cir. 1981); EEOC
Dec. No. 71-1418, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 580, 582 (1971).
212. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1042-43, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct.
1736 (1989); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1113 (1981); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752, 754 (D. Or. 1973) (language
restriction in tavern allegedly necessary to stem fear on the part of White clientele that
Chicanos were talking about Whites); EEOC Dec. No. 81-25, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1820, 1821 (1981) (fellow workers and customers annoyed at Spanish conversa-
tions between co-workers); EEOC Dec. No. 72-0281, EEOC Dec. (CCH) 6293 (1971)
(Anglo barbers irritated at Spanish conversations of Hispanic barber).
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rules reduce disruptions in the workplace.21 Employers also
have claimed that the rules support the use of English in this
predominantly English-speaking society.214 The argument that
English-only rules facilitate supervision by those who do not un-
derstand languages other than English has been raised as well.2"5
Finally, in one reported case, an employer justified such a rule as
necessary for safety and efficiency in potentially dangerous areas
of the employer's premises and during emergencies. 1 Each of
these asserted justifications will be analyzed under the business
justification standard to determine whether it can support an
English-only rule in the workplace.
For this analysis, a distinction should be made between jobs in
which a different language is required and jobs in which there is
no such requirement. 1 7 It will be more difficult for an employer
to advance a cogent business justification for a language restric-
tion in a job that requires the use of a different language than in
a job with no such requirement. When speaking Spanish is a re-
quirement of the job, such as the sales position in Garcia or the
municipal court clerk job in Gutierrez, the Spanish language is
already an established part of the work environment. If fluency
in Spanish is required in a job, this must be in order to provide
a required or desired service in Spanish. A rational employer, by
hiring someone to perform part or all of his job in a different
language, has acted to reduce disruptions and confusion and to
maximize efficiency. At Gloor Lumber, for example, the em-
ployer hired bilingual sales clerks to enhance its appeal to His-
panic customers and maximize revenues.2 8 In the municipal
213. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042 (stating that the employer contended "the rule [was]
necessary to prevent the workplace from turning into a 'Tower of Babel' ").
214. Id. at 1042; Garcia, 618 F.2d at 267.
215. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043; Garcia, 618 F.2d at 267; EEOC Dec. No. 71-446, 2
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1127, 1128 (1970) (employer apparently attempted to jus-
tify rule based on inability of supervisors to understand Spanish).
216. EEOC Dec. No. 83-7, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 6836 (1983) (the employer
claimed that the English-only rule was necessary to assure effective communication
among its employees during emergencies, and that the rule helped to prevent or control
fires, explosions and other casualties in a refinery while employees were working with
potentially dangerous equipment and materials); see also Saucedo v. Brothers Well
Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 921 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (employer sought to justify English-
only rule during drilling of an oil well).
217. Under appropriate circumstances, it can be lawful to require bilingual ability.
See Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1129, 1133 (D.D.C.
1982) (upholding the employer's requirement of bilingual ability in Spanish and English
in an action brought under the fifth amendment, Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
218. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
The court wrote: "Of the eight salesmen employed by Gloor in 1975, seven were His-
panic, a matter perhaps of business necessity, because 75% of the population in its busi-
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court, the situation must have been far more chaotic when clerks
who did not speak Spanish attempted to conduct court business
with persons who did not speak English. In cases such as these,
business necessity requires the use of different languages in the
workplace. Accordingly, it is illogical for these employers to ar-
gue that there is also a business justification for restricting the
use of the different language.219
For jobs in which a different language is required, some of the
potential justifications for a language restriction are illogical and
could not, therefore, constitute a business justification. Because
a different language is already an established part of the work-
place, a language restriction probably cannot effectively reduce
disruptions in the workplace. In such a case, whatever additional
Spanish or other language results from conversations between
employees is unlikely to be significantly more disruptive than
the standard work environment.22 Furthermore, the asserted
justification of "supporting the use of English" makes no sense
in a job that requires a different language for its proper perform-
ance.221 Nor can supervision of job performance partially or
wholly conducted in a different language be enhanced by requir-
ing personal conversations between employees to be in En-
glish.222 Although the requirement of a different language in a
job may undermine certain asserted business justifications, the
question of the validity of language restrictions in other jobs,
and for other reasons, remains.
22 3
A. Reducing Racial Tension and Fear
Employers claim that English-only rules promote racial har-
mony and reduce racial tension and fear.22 In Garcia, for exam-
ple, the employer stated that customers who understood no
ness area is of Hispanic background and many of Gloor's customers wish to be waited on
by a salesman who speaks Spanish." Id. at 267.
219. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043. This analysis only works, of course, where the
language necessary for the job is the same as the restricted language.
220. Id. at 1042.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1043.
223. Interestingly, the two principal cases discussing the legality of English-only rules
involved jobs in which the ability to speak Spanish was a requirement of the job.
224. See supra note 212 and cases cited therein. Although the Gutierrez court de-
scribed it as racial tension and fear, the tension and fear resulting from the use of a




Spanish became irritated when employees spoke Spanish to each
other.22 5 In Gutierrez, the municipal court asserted that its rule
reduced racial tension and fear among employees.226 The munic-
ipal court listed a number of very common fears in attempting
to justify its rule. The employer was concerned that Spanish
might be used to make discriminatory, insubordinate, or belit-
tling comments about fellow employees.227 The employer also
was concerned that Spanish could be used to conceal the sub-
stance of conversations.2 28 A restriction on the ability of Spanish
speakers to speak their primary language was necessary, there-
fore, to assuage these fears of employees who spoke no
Spanish.229
Such fears, however, are exactly the kind of stereotyped judg-
ments that Title VII was designed to eliminate from the work-
place,2 30 and are no different from the many racial or sexual ste-
reotypes that cannot be used as the basis for discriminatory
treatment of members of a protected group under Title VII. It is
well-established law under Title VII' that customer preference
does not provide the business justification that will support a
discriminatory rule.231 If customer preference provides no justifi-
cation, then neither do the discriminatory preferences of fellow
employees. As the Supreme Court stated, "[p]rivate biases may
be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect." '232 Accordingly, the reduction of
employees' or customers' racial tensions and fears cannot justify
an English-only rule under the business justification standard.233
225. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
226. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-43.
227. Id. at 1042.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See infra note 243 and accompanying text. Courts recognize the problem of lin-
gering stereotypes. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777,
2786, (1988) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (mentioning "the problem of subconscious
stereotypes"); Guardians Ass'n of New York City Police Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 431 F. Supp. 526, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("As has been seen in the
areas of race and sex discrimination, long-accepted stereotypes too often help perpetuate
discriminatory practices even though they have no basis in fact.").
231. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); see
also Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding stereo-
typed customer preferences did not justify sexually discriminatory conduct); Witt v. Sec-
retary of Labor, 397 F. Supp. 673, 678 (D. Me. 1975) (holding customer preference for a
male hairdresser was not a bona fide occupational qualification).
232. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
233. Indeed, this must be the right result because, otherwise, the "reduction of racial
tension" rationale could be used to justify egregious racial or sexual discrimination.
There are still many places in the United States where racial or sexual tension would be
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Moreover, someone who does not understand Spanish has little
basis for reaching negative judgments about the content of con-
versations in Spanish. The employer, fellow employees, or cus-
tomers who speak no Spanish simply assume, in the absence of
understanding, that Spanish-language conversations are ill-in-
tentioned, discriminatory, insubordinate,- belittling, or secretive.
There was little or no evidence in the Gutierrez case to prove
that these fears and concerns were justified.2 34 Indeed, the evi-
dence in the case showed that racial tension increased as a result
of the English-only rule.23 ' The EEOC itself has reached this
conclusion. In its regulations discussing national origin discrimi-
nation, the EEOC states that restrictions on languages other
than English may increase racial tension.238 Evidence of such ra-
cial tension would greatly assist plaintiffs who, under Wards
Cove, must now disprove an employer's assertion that English-
only rules decrease racial tension.2 37 Plaintiffs may even be able
to prove that racial tension increases as the result of English-
only rules. Such racial tension, induced by restricting the ability
to speak one's primary language, is apparent in several of the
cases that have discussed the issue.238 If a plaintiff can prove
that an English-only rule increases racial tension, it will obvi-
ously be difficult for an employer to claim that the reduction of
racial tension justifies the rule.13 9
reduced for White persons or for males if Blacks, Hispanics or women were denied em-
ployment opportunities or the ability to use public accomodations. Yet the fact that such
tension may exist cannot provide a justification for discrimination against these pro-
tected groups without violating Title VII. See Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp.
752, 755 (D. Or. 1973) ("Catering to prejudice out of fear of provoking greater prejudice
only perpetuates racism.").
234. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031,. 1042-43, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct.
1736 (1989).
235. Id. at 1042.
236. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (1989) (prohibiting employees from speaking their primary
language at all times may create an "atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation
based on national origin").
237. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126 (1989). See supra notes
186-88 and accompanying text.
238. See Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042; Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F.
Supp. 919, 921-22 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (racial tension and fight resulting from employer's
discharge of employee for speaking Spanish on the job); Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F.
Supp. 752, 754 (D. Or. 1973) (rule prohibiting foreign languages in a tavern led to racial
tension and assault upon Hispanic customers by regular customers of the tavern).
239. The net effect of such an English-only rule, rather than to reduce racial or cul-
tural tension, may be merely to transfer such tension from persons objecting to different
language conversations to those persons engaging in such conversations.
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B. Reducing Disruptions in the Workplace
Employers claim that a limited English-only rule reduces dis-
ruptions in the workplace and prevents the workplace from be-
coming a "Tower of Babel. ' 240 Suppose that an employer finds
that conversations in languages other than English are "disrup-
tive," and seeks to eliminate such conversations with a limited
English-only rule. This employer permits employees to enjoy
private conversations in English in the workplace and seeks to
limit only conversations in Spanish. There is no permissible rea-
son why two employees' private conversation in Spanish would
be any more disruptive than the same conversation would be in
English. If the employer or fellow employees feel annoyed or
threatened by conversations in a different language, or if they
feel suspicious about what is being said, these feelings are proba-
bly based on negative feelings about persons speaking in lan-
guages other than English or on negative assumptions about the
content of such conversations. As discussed above, such private
fears or biases cannot constitute the business justification for a
rule that discriminates against a protected group.2 41 An 'em-
ployer who allows private conversations between employees in
English should have great difficulty justifying a rule attempting
to restrict the same conversations in Spanish to minimize dis-
ruptions. The only way to minimize such disruptions, consistent
with Title VII, entails prohibiting all private conversations be-
tween employees, whether in Spanish, English, or any other lan-
guage. 24 12 Although somewhat draconian, at least such a solution
is even-handed, creating no greater burden on the protected
class than on the majority class. Even-handed treatment is, of
course, the very goal of Title VII.243
240. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042.
241. See supra notes 231-33 and accompanying text.
242. Such a prohibition, applied to persons whose primary language is English, is
only slightly more burdensome than an English-only rule is for someone with very lim-
ited abilities in English.
243. See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND IX OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 2001, 2026, 2150.
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C. Supporting the Use of English in the Nation
Employers seek to justify English-only rules on the basis that
these rules support the use of English in the nation.244 The argu-
ment may take several forms. An employer, like the municipal
court in Gutierrez, may argue that an English-only rule is re-
quired by state statutes making English the "official" language
of a state.2 4 5 A related justification, offered by the employer in
Garcia, is that an English-only rule improves the English flu-
ency of persons whose primary language is not English.246
One can wonder whether an employer's voluntary desire to
support perceived national or state policies can constitute a bus-
iness justification at all, as such a desire may have nothing to do
with an employer's business. 47 The fact that a state constitu-
tional provision or statute makes English the "official" language
of the state does not automatically provide a business justifica-
tion for an employer's English-only rule; any such statute, in or-
der to be a valid justification for an employer's English-only
rule, must itself be supported by a business justification.248
An employer's desire to improve the English fluency of em-
ployees by restricting the use of languages other than English
may provide a more relevant employer purpose. The Supreme
Court, however, has rejected this justification when offered for
an English literacy requirement as a qualification for the right to
vote.2 49 This should make the justification less plausible in the
workplace. Furthermore, an English-only rule enacted for this
purpose probably cannot survive examination under the busi-
ness justification standard for at least two reasons. First, a plain-
tiff can demonstrate that there are less discriminatory alterna-
tives that would more effectively improve an employee's fluency
244. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. Such English-only statutes may
themselves be unconstitutional. See Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990)
(invalidating Arizona's English-only provision as violating the first amendment of the
U.S. Constitution).
245. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1042, 1043-44, vacated as moot, 109
S. Ct. 1736 (1989).
246. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113
(1981).
247. Cf. Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 371 (4th Cir. 1980) (plural-
ity opinion), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) ("If this personal compassion [for preg-
nant stewardesses] can be attributed to corporate policy it is commendable, but in the
area of civil rights, personal . . . decisions not affecting business operations are best left
to individuals who are the targets of discrimination.").
248. Cf. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 & n.14 (1977) (holding that stat-
ute itself did not establish a business justification in a sexual discrimination context).
249. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 (1966).
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in English. An employer could offer English classes to employ-
ees, or offer to reimburse employees for courses they take to im-
prove their English. Both of these alternatives would more effec-
tively accomplish the employer's stated purpose' with less
adverse impact.2 50 Second, a restriction on languages other than
English does little to improve an employee's abilities in English.
It forces employees to rely exclusively on their English, such as
it is, but, absent some instruction or assistance, does little to
improve that English. It is questionable, therefore, whether an
English-only rule facilitates fluency in English.
D. More Effective Supervision
Another justification offered for English-only rules is that they
enable more effective supervision. Like the business justification
itself, effective supervision is more important in the essential as-
pects of a job than in the tangential aspects. In order for more
effective supervision to constitute a business justification, the
English-only rule must enhance significantly a supervisor's abil-
ity to monitor the performance of a job.2 .
250. Under Wards Cove, the cost of such alternatives to the employer would be rele-
vant in determining whether they are as effective as the challenged rule or practice, but
additional cost to the employer would not necessarily defeat them as viable, less-discrim-
inatory alternatives. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2127 (1989).
Courts will have to determine what costs for less discriminatory alternatives can be im-
posed upon employers under the business justification standard. Under the former busi-
ness necessity defense, cost considerations gained greater judicial acceptance as a legiti-
mate defense to liability under the disparate impact theory, posing a danger to the
effectiveness of Title VII and the accomplishment of its goals. See Brodin, Costs, Profits,
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 318, 344-58 (1987):
The allowance of such cost justification in fair employment law is ill-advised. If
Title VII is to operate effectively in the American workplace to extend opportu-
nities to groups traditionally excluded, justification for discriminatory practices
must be narrowly confined to situations where job performance, productivity, or
the very financial existence of the enterprise is at stake.
Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). The explicit mention in Wards Cove of cost considerations
as relevant in evaluating the "equal effectiveness" of less discriminatory alternatives of-
fered by plaintiffs sanctions and furthers the cost defense to liability under the disparate
impact theory. See Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2127; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2790 (1988) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) ("Factors such as
the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in deter-
mining whether they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving
the employer's legitimate business goals.").
251. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26 (stating that a challenged practice must serve
significantly and substantially the legitimate employment goals of the employer)l; see
also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[T]he challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve.") (footnote
omitted); cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971)
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An English-only rule can enhance supervision in only one way:
it allows supervisors without skill in a different language to
know the content of employees' conversations. Access to the
content of such conversations alone, however, cannot constitute
a business justification without a showing that supervision is sig-
nificantly enhanced by such access. The employer must also
show that access to the content of such conversations is some-
how job-related. Accordingly, if an English-only rule limits the
use of other languages at certain times or in certain areas of the
workplace, a business justification exists only if access to the
content of conversations at those times and in those areas re-
lates to the job and significantly enhances supervision.
The extent to which knowledge of conversations relates to the
job varies depending on the type of job. For example, in a pro-
duction job such as manufacturing widgets, the essential part of
the job is producing widgets. The important ingredients of job
performance will be the quantity and quality of widgets pro-
duced, efficiency and safety in producing them, reliability, dili-
gence, and other typical factors. Assume that this widget manu-
facturer institutes a rule prohibiting conversations between
employees in languages other than English while they work. The
employer asserts that the rule enhances the supervision of em-
ployees. This justification should fail because there is no busi-
ness reason for a supervisor to have access to the content of em-
ployee conversations that do not relate to important tasks of the
job.252 As long as job performance is good, measured by the
quantity, quality, efficiency, and safety of widget production, the
content of employee conversations should make little or no dif-
ference to the employer.
If employee conversations interfere with job performance, the
interference results from the fact that such conversations occur,
not from the fact that they occur in a language other than En-
glish. Accordingly, if the employer permits conversations be-
tween employees in English, then he can assert no business jus-
(stating that to constitute a business necessity, the criteria needs to be "an irresistible
demand" of the job); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 57, at 359 (noting that crite-
ria must be reasonably necessary for job performance).
252. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431-32 (1971) ("If an employment practice [that has a disparate impact] cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited. . . .[A]ny given re-
quirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."). The re-
quirement that an employment practice with disparate impact must be job related still
appears to be part of the disparate impact standard. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126




tification based on more effective supervision for restricting
similar conversations in languages other than English.
The same outcome holds true in sales jobs. The salesperson
sells merchandise and provides good service to customers. The
content of an employee's conversations with fellow employees is
typically not an important part of the job. If an employee's con-
versations with his fellow employees interfere with service to
customers and job performance, it is because such conversations
occur, not because of the language in which they occur or their
content. Accordingly, if an employer allows employee conversa-
tions in English, more effective supervision will often not furnish
a business justification for an English-only rule. If customers are
annoyed at conversations in languages other than English, that
annoyance is based on private biases and furnishes no justifica-
tion for an English-only rule.253
A recently decided case in the Ninth Circuit, Jurado v.
Eleven-Fifty Corp.,2 54 illustrates how these principles might ap-
ply to a job in which the content of the non-English speech is at
the core of a job. The plaintiff, Valentine Jurado, was a bilingual
disc jockey. For several years he had conducted his radio show in
English. Attempting to increase the radio station's Hispanic au-
dience, the program director asked Jurado to use some Spanish
words and phrases during his broadcasts. Jurado complied, but
his use of Spanish did not increase his Hispanic audience. A
consultant hired by the station concluded that the bilingual
broadcasts actually hurt the station's ratings by confusing listen-
ers about the station's programming. Accordingly, the program
director told Jurado to stop using Spanish during his show.
Jurado refused and was fired.255
Both the district court2 56 and the court of appeals5 7 found
that Jurado's discharge did not violate Title VII. Although both
courts relied on the rationale of Garcia v. Gloor,255 the Gutierrez
decision discusses Jurado and offers a rationale more consistent
with the business justification standard.25 As the Gutierrez
253. See supra notes at 231-33 and accompanying text.
254. 630 F. Supp. 569 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd, 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
255. Jurado, 630 F. Supp. at 570-71.
256. Id. at 578-80.
257. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987).
258. Jurado, 630 F. Supp. at 580; 813 F.2d at 1411-12 (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618
F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981). Both courts reasoned that
because Jurado was bilingual, he could readily comply with the employer's English-only
rules and therefore there was no disparate impact and no violation of Title VII.
259. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1041, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct.
1736 (1989).
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court recognized, the content of radio broadcasts is the product
produced by a radio station.26 Because Jurado's use of Spanish
had negative effects, the station's business - its ability to broad-
cast as it chose and to sustain the audience for its broadcasts -
was undermined by Jurado's refusal to comply with the program
director's instructions.26 '
Although the employer in Jurado did not attempt to justify
the language restriction as necessary for more effective supervi-
sion, the case illustrates how a language restriction may be per-
missible. Where content is at the core of the job, an employer
may be able to sustain the business justification for restrictions
on the use of languages other than English.2"2
Courts must evaluate the job-relatedness of language restric-
tions based on the need for more effective supervision. When
evaluating the "more effective supervision" business justifica-
tion, it may be useful for a court to consider a spectrum ranging
from jobs in which the content of employee conversations has no
job relation, such as widget production, to jobs in which the con-
tent of conversations is at the core of the job and highly job-
related, like the disc jockey in Jurado. In the former kind of job,
it will be difficult for an employer to show the business justifica-
tion for an English-only rule based on more effective supervi-
sion. In the latter kind of job, where content is at the core, an
employer may be able to justify a language restriction.
Even when an employer can offer evidence of a business justi-
fication based on the need for more effective supervision, a
plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a more effective
and less discriminatory alternative. "[T]he best way to ensure
that supervisors are apprised of how well . . . bilingual employ-
ees are performing . . . their assigned tasks would be to employ
Spanish-speaking supervisors." '263 A plaintiff able to offer such





262. See Fragante v. City of Honolulu, 49 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 437, 439 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("Employers may lawfully base an employment decision upon an individual's
accent when-but only when-it interferes materially with job performance. There is
nothing improper about an employer making such an honest assessment of a candidate
for a job when oral communication skills" are necessary) (citations omitted) (text omit-
ted from amended decision reported at 888 F.2d 591). See also infra note 276 and ac-
companying text.
263. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1041.
264. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2126-27 (1989).
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E. Safety and Efficiency
Although no courts have decided the issue, an employer in a
proceeding before the EEOC used safety and efficiency as the
basis for justifying a limited English-only rule. 66 Safety and effi-
ciency are well-recognized grounds for establishing a business
justification under Title VII,26 and employers are likely to as-
sert them in support of English-only rules in the future. The re-
quirements of the "safety and efficiency" justification arose in
cases prior to Wards Cove in the context of the business neces-
sity defense, which required employers to prove the business ne-
cessity for a challenged practice. Plaintiffs, now carrying the
burden of persuasion on the business justification for an em-
ployer's challenged practice, will have to disprove the validity of
the employer's offered justification.267
The safety and efficiency justification was asserted to support
mandatory leave and minimum height requirements in the air-
line industry,"'8 and to justify minimum height or strength re-
quirements for police officers.2 9 The analysis in such cases is
particularly useful because it illustrates the kind of evidence re-
quired by courts analyzing the safety and efficiency justification
when a job's duties include managing emergencies. By analogy,
the same kind of evidence will be required from plaintiffs seek-
265. EEOC Dec. No. 83-7, 2 Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) 1 6836 (1983). The employer
claimed that effective communication among its employees was necessary during emer-
gencies and while employees were working with potentially dangerous equipment and
materials in order to prevent or control fires, explosions and other casualties; the em-
ployer alleged that its English-only rule was narrowly drawn to fit these circumstances.
Id. The EEOC, however, apparently accepted the employer's claimed necessity for the
rule with no showing of proof of the justification for the rule. Id.
266. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 331-32 & n.14 (1977); see also Note, Busi-
ness Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Ap-
proach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 108 (1974).
267. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
268. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984); Har-
riss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676-77 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365, 371 (4th Cir. 1980) (plurality opinion), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Boyd v. Ozark Airlines, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1061, 1062 (E.D.
Mo. 1976).
269. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32 (1977); Craig v. County of
Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 666-68 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981);
Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1374, 1379-81 (9th Cir. 1979); Davis v.
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. New
York, 21 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1286, 1293, 1296 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (findings of fact
not included in decision as reported at 475 F. Supp. 1103); League of United Latin
American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 882 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Officers
for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of San Francisco, 395 F. Supp. 378, 380 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
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ing to disprove the justification for an English-only rule involv-
ing hazards or emergencies.
As with the other supposed justifications, the employer carries
the burden of production.270 Merely asserting the rationale
should not suffice. As one court stated, "the incantation of a
safety rationale is not an abracadabra to which [a] [c]ourt must
defer judgment."27' An employer's subjective belief that a prac-
tice is necessary, without any supporting evidence, is insufficient
to justify a discriminatory practice.272
Assuming an employer can meet its burden, the plaintiff will
have to prove that conversations in a primary language different
from English do not interfere with the specific job-related tasks
he must perform routinely in particularly hazardous areas of the
workplace and during emergencies.273 Courts may also require
expert testimony establishing that the use of different languages
does not interfere with safety or efficiency.
274
In evaluating the effectiveness of an English-only rule, the
court should consider the purpose of the rule and what the rule
actually accomplishes. In a job involving hazards or possible
emergencies, the purpose of a limited English-only rule must be
to improve communication between employees and to reduce
confusion. The English-only rule ensures that all communica-
tions will be in English, thus improving the ability of those
whose primary language is English to understand all conversa-
tions between employees when the rule is in force. By improving
communication, so the argument goes, the rule increases safety
on the job and improves the employees' ability to respond to an
emergency.
270. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2125-26.
271. Maclennan v. American Airlines, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 466, 472 (E.D. Va. 1977).
272. See Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 667 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918,
941-43 (10th Cir. 1979).
273. In cases challenging mandatory leave requirements for pregnant flight attend-
ants, courts, applying the business necessity standard, have required employers to pro-
vide proof of the specific duties of flight attendants, both normally and during emergen-
cies, and of the specific experiences of pregnant attendants in their jobs. See Burwell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1980) (plurality opinion). Employ-
ers also have been required, under the former standard of business necessity, to present
considerable expert testimony on the effect of pregnancy on job performance. Id. See
also Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1980); Levin v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 997 (5th Cir. 1984). Now that the burden of proof on
the employer's justification has been shifted to plaintiffs under Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at
2125-26, plaintiffs presumably will have to offer similar kinds of proof of the invalidity of
an employer's asserted justification.
274. Cf. supra note 273 and cases cited therein (noting that expert testimony was
required in cases based on sexual discrimination).
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Upon careful analysis, however, one can question whether an
English-only rule effectively carries out its purpose. Although an
English-only rule clearly would improve the ability of persons
whose primary language is English to understand all conversa-
tions in the workplace, such a rule may decrease the effective-
ness of communications, and therefore interfere with safety and
efficiency for persons whose primary language is Spanish or
some other language. The reviewing court, therefore, should con-
sider the composition of an employer's work force to determine
whether English-only communication enhances or interferes
with safety and efficiency. Furthermore, an English-only rule
based on safety and efficiency often may be unnecessary. A ra-
tional employer hires and retains employees who are capable of
understanding the safety requirements of a job and of perform-
ing their jobs satisfactorily. Where ability to speak and under-
stand English is necessary, an employer may properly require
such an ability as a prerequisite for employment." 5 In a poten-
tially hazardous job in which lives and equipment may be at
risk, it would make no sense for an employer to place his trust in
an employee who could not perform the job. Even if his primary
language is not English, an employee working in such a job must
have been found by the employer to both understand and com-
municate well enough in English to meet the requirements of
the job in the first place. Additionally, a rational employer will
train his employees, probably in English, to handle situations
that could arise on the job. In a crisis situation, it would be com-
pletely irrational for a trained and capable Spanish-speaking
employee to defy his experience, training, and common sense by
attempting to communicate in Spanish to people who will not
275. See e.g., Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, 660 F.2d 1217,
1222 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that ability to speak and read some English is a require-
ment for virtually every job in a highly sophisticated hospital); Duong Nhat Tran v. City
of Houston, 35 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 471, 472 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that
mastery of English could be required in job involving explanation of requirements of city
law to building owners); Mejia v. New York Sheraton Hotel, 459 F. Supp. 375, 377-78
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), modified, 476 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that adequate
mastery of English could be required for hotel front office position, which involved con-
tact with guests); Chung v. Morehouse College, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1084,
1088-89 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (holding that mastery of English could be required for college
faculty position); cf. Vasquez v. McAllen Bay & Supply Co., 660 F.2d 686, 688 (5th Cir.
1981) (finding no violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in employer's requirement that truck
drivers speak English because the employer lacked discriminatory intent); Frontera v.
Sindell, 522 F.2d 1215, 1220 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that requirement of successful per-
formance on English-language civil service exam for a carpenter position is not a viola-
tion of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 or fourteenth amendment).
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understand him.2 76 Rationality, therefore, and the need to per-
form a job or to handle a crisis, may accomplish the same objec-
tives as a limited English-only rule.
To the extent that an English-only rule in a dangerous em-
ployment situation is based on an employer's fear that an irra-
tional response to a crisis by a bilingual person will increase the
risk of catastrophe, it appears that, under Wards Cove, a plain-
tiff would have to prove that such a fear is unjustified. This
could be very difficult.1 7 Once an employer has a bilingual work
force, the risk that bilingual employees might speak their pri-
mary language is always there. The inquiry, therefore, should be
whether routine observance of an English-only rule diminishes
that risk.
A plaintiff, however, can probably show the existence of less
discriminatory measures that accomplish the employer's safety
and efficiency purposes. In a hazardous business, an employer
concerned about possible confusion due to language differences
among his employees should post emergency instructions and of-
fer training in the languages best understood by his employees.
Such measures are both less restrictive and probably more effec-
tive than an English-only rule for persons whose primary lan-
guage is not English."'
Like the existence of less discriminatory alternatives, the pres-
ence of counterexamples provides persuasive evidence of pretext
or lack of job relation. A counterexample is a case in which an
employer, without any decrease in safety or efficiency, fails to
adhere to an allegedly necessary discriminatory practice.279 In
one case an employer attempted to justify a minimum height
276. Persons successfully holding jobs requiring ability in English are likely to be at
the more fully bilingual end of the bilingual spectrum. See supra notes 93-94. Such per-
sons, who are more fully able to express themselves in a second language, are probably
less apt to slip inadvertently into speaking their primary languages than persons whose
limited abilities in English place them at the less bilingual end of the spectrum.
277. Formerly, under the business necessity standard, employers were required to
prove that such fears were justified. For example, employers were required to prove that
pregnant flight attendants and short police officers could not perform their jobs safely,
which employers were, at least in some cases, unable to do. For cases challenging preg-
nancy rules for flight attendants, see supra note 268. For cases challenging minimum
height requirements for police officers, see supra note 269.
278. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655 (1966) (stating that ability to read
or understand Spanish-language newspapers, radio, and television is as effective a means
of obtaining political information as ability to read English).
279. Cf. Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) ("If it is
established that an employer takes a lax approach to safety in comparable matters, the
employer may be hard-pressed to convince the court that it deems the contribution to
safety effected by the challenged policy to be necessary .... ") (footnote omitted).
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requirement of 5'7" for a truck driver position.28 Indiscreetly,
the employer had hired many nonminority drivers unable to
meet the minimum height requirement; one of these drivers, a 5'
4 1/2" white man, had performed years of accident-free driving
and had received safe driving awards. 21 The court concluded
that "if Anglos less than 5' 7" tall could perform safely and effi-
ciently . . ., there is no reason to suppose that Spanish sur-
named Americans could not do likewise. ' 2 2 Accordingly, in ad-
dition to considering the existence of less discriminatory and
equally effective alternatives, plaintiffs' lawyers challenging
English-only rules should consider the consistency with which
the employers have applied their rules.
In some circumstances, employers may be able to justify
English-only rules that are not unduly discriminatory, based on
safety and efficiency. An English-only rule, however, must actu-
ally and significantly contribute to greater safety or efficiency.
283
The employer's mere assumptions or beliefs, like the beliefs that
pregnant flight attendants or short police officers cannot do their
jobs, are not sufficient to support a discriminatory English-only
rule.2 4 The presence of more than one language in the work-
place does not necessarily make a dangerous workplace less safe.
One can be as safe and efficient in Spanish, or any other lan-
guage, as in English.28 5
280. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 941-42 (10th Cir.
1979).
281. Id. at 941.
282. Id. at 942.
283. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26 (1989).
284. Id. at 2126 (holding that an employer bears the burden of producing evidence of
a business justification; a "mere insubstantial justification [offered by an employer] will
not suffice, because such a low standard of review would permit discrimination to be
practiced through the use of spurious, seemingly neutral employment practices"). Ac-
cordingly, although it remains to be seen how the courts will apply the new standard
established in Wards Cove, mere assumptions about or beliefs in the validity of a chal-
lenged practice do not appear to be sufficient to pass muster. See, e.g., Craig v. County of
Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 667 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S, 919 (1981)
("Mere opinion testimony by sheriff's department personnel that height is effective in
control functions is inadequate to establish the significant correlation that is required
under Title VII."); United States v. Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077, 1088 (E.D. Va. 1978)
(stating that opinions of five members of state police that "height and weight are useful
in police work" fail to establish job relatedness, but establish only "a good faith belief of
job relatedness").
285. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 655 (1966) (stating that in exercising
the right to vote "an ability to read or understand Spanish is as effective as ability to
read English").
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F. Summary of Analysis of English-Only Rules Under the
Business Justification Standard
This Part of the Article has examined the various justifica-
tions offered by employers in support of English-only rules: re-
ducing racial tension and fear; reducing disruptions; supporting
the English language and improving employees' English skills;
enhancing the effectiveness of supervision; and enhancing safety
and efficiency in the workplace. Applying the business justifica-
tion standard, it appears that three of the potential justifica-
tions-reducing racial tension and fear,2"8 reducing disrup-
tions,"' and improving employees' English skills288-probably
cannot pass muster under the standard. English-only rules sim-
ply are not effective for such purposes. English-only rules in-
crease, rather than reduce, racial tensions and fears. Different-
language conversations are no more disruptive than conversa-
tions in English, except for legally impermissible reasons. And
English-only rules do little to improve the English of persons
whose primary language is not English.
Some of the other asserted justifications do not fare much bet-
ter under the business justification standard. It is questionable
whether supporting the use of English in this country is a busi-
ness purpose at all. A desire to enhance the effectiveness of su-
pervision cannot constitute a business justification unless a su-
pervisor's access to the content of different-language
conversations relates to the job and enhances supervision. Fur-
thermore, a plaintiff often will be able to show a less discrimina-
tory, and more effective, alternative to an English-only rule: an
employer needs only to hire a supervisor conversant in the dif-
ferent language to achieve more effective supervision." 9
Under appropriate circumstances, an employer may be able to
justify an English-only rule on the grounds of safety and effi-
ciency. The new business justification standard requires the
plaintiff to disprove the employer's asserted justification. This
standard will be as difficult for plaintiffs to meet with regard to
the safety and efficiency justification as it was for employers to
meet under the business necessity standard. Plaintiffs, however,
286. See supra Part V.A.
287. See supra Part V.B.
288. See supra Part V.C.
289. Gutierrez v. Municipal Ct., 838 F.2d 1031, 1043, vacated as moot, 109 S. Ct.
1736 (1989).
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may be able to prevail by demonstrating less restrictive and
more effective alternatives.
VI. CONCLUSION
The long history of discrimination against members of lan-
guage minority groups in the United States suggests that they,
like persons whose race or religion differs from those of the ma-
jority, warrant protection under Title VII.29 ° The strong link be-
tween the primary language, ethnicity, and national origin of
persons whose primary language is different from English justi-
fies protection for such persons under Title VII. This link be-
tween primary language and national origin exists regardless of
bilingualism." ' Furthermore, the difficulty of second-language
acquisition makes primary language practically immutable, an-
other basis for protection under the statute. For these reasons,
discrimination against persons whose primary language is differ-
ent from English is a form of national origin discrimination.
English-only rules have a disparate impact on persons whose
primary language is not English. Indeed, the impact of these
rules is beyond "disparate." The rules result in an exclusive ad-
verse impact because English-only rules can disqualify or affect
only members of protected national origin groups. English-only
rules, therefore, cannot be facially neutral in the same sense as
other neutral rules analyzed under the disparate impact theory.
The demographics of the United States indicate that, by the
year 2000, Hispanics will be the largest ethnic minority group in
the United States. 92 The primary language of many of these
persons will be Spanish. They will bear the impact of English-
only rules in the workplace along with other persons whose pri-
mary language is different from English.
The issues posed in Garcia and Gutierrez, consequently, are
very likely to return to the courts. Courts should recognize the
link between primary language, ethnicity, and national origin.
Courts also should recognize that English-only rules have an ex-
clusive adverse impact upon protected language minority groups.
290. Cf. Olagues v. Russoniello, 797 F.2d 1511, 1521 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated as moot,
484 U.S. 806 (1987) ("[Clourts have long recognized the history or discriminatory treat-
ment inflicted on Chinese and Hispanic people.") (citations omitted). See SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 114, at 791-97. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
291. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1039. See Karst, supra note 81, at 351-57; J. FISHMAN,
supra note 17, at 70.
292. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, courts should evaluate such rules as disparate
treatment because of national origin and require employers to
establish a bona fide occupational qualification defense for such
rules. In the alternative, if a court adheres to the disparate im-
pact theory for analyzing English-only rules, employers should
be required to meet a strict standard of business necessity. Even
if a court adheres to the permissive standards of Wards Cove in
analyzing an English-only rule, such a rule should be upheld
only when the rule relates to the job and effectuates its asserted
purpose, when the rule is not a pretext for discrimination, and
when a plaintiff fails to demonstrate the availability of less dis-
criminatory, but equally effective, alternatives.
Conversations in one language need not be more disruptive,
nor less safe, than conversations in another language.
